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THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: 
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Joseph M. Dodge, II* 
T HE first amendment to the Constitution begins with the words: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "1 Although there 
is clearly some overlap between the establishment and free exercise 
clauses,2 there is a fundamental distinction between the two: the 
establishment clause is applicable when government adopts a policy 
to aid religion generally or to confer benefits upon some religions 
in preference to others; the free exercise clause is invoked where 
state action has an inhibitory effect upon an individual's beliefs or 
a religious group's ritual practices.3 The former is thus a more spe-
cific prohibition against the promotion of religion or religions by the 
state, while the free exercise clause expresses basic American notions 
about the autonomy of the individual and the restriction of govern-
ment to its proper sphere.4 
No overriding theory has heretofore been proposed capable of 
allocating the various rules of decision in free exercise cases accord-
ing to an appropriate classification of fact situations. This Article 
suggests an objective sociological approach to defining and weighing 
the governmental and religious interests inhering in a given free 
exercise claim in order to eliminate value preferences from the 
constitutional weighing process. Religious interests will be ranked 
according to functional criteria internal to all religious systems and 
not dependent upon the belief content of any given sect. State in-
terests will be analyzed in terms of formalized modes of govern-
mental action involving action generally and religion in particular, 
• B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1967, Harvard University. -Ed. 
I. The first amendment has been made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940). 
2. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See generally Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) Gustice Stewart, concurring); Kurland, Of Church 
a11d State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. I (1961); Note, The Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clause: Conflict or Coordination?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 929 (1964). 
3. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963). 
4. See United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1930) (Chief Justice Hughes, 
dissenting), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
For general discussions of the free exercise clause, see Fernandez, The Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 546 (1963); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Con-
science, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806 (1958); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, 
and Doctrinal Development: Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1381 (1967). 
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taking into consideration certain constitutional limitations on state 
power over the individual, over interpersonal relationships, and over 
intragroup behavior. The resulting method of adjusting competing 
governmental and religious interests may be characterized as value-
neutral, and is capable not only of rationalizing past free exercise 
decisions, but also of resolving current controversies and of sug-
gesting the direction of future development. 
I. SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. Basic Approach 
Before formulating rules of decision appropriate for particular 
fact situations, two extreme philosophies of adjudication under the 
free exercise clause must be dealt with. Some commentators contend 
that the free exercise clause, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, em-
bodies personal rights which are entitled to absolute protection 
against state power.5 Without analyzing this proposition in detail, 
it should be noted that its rationale as usually presented is primarily 
political: speech of "governing importance ... includes the vast 
range of forms of thought and expression by which the voter might 
equip himself to exercise a proper judgment in casting his ballot."6 
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how religious freedom relates to 
the political process. Although religion may have some public and 
instrumental aspects, its essence resides in its private and personal 
qualities; thus, courts have traditionally concluded that the core 
of the free exercise clause is freedom of conscience and belief. But if 
these freedoms are considered to be ends in themselves,7 nothing is 
to prevent the constitutional definition of the powers of government 
or the nature of the political process from being similarly exalted. 
If, on the other hand, all of the terms and provisions of the Constitu-
tion are equally means for attaining the goals set forth in the pre-
amble, the free exercise clause is no higher in priority than, for 
example, the commerce clause. Either way, the fact that liberty ap-
pears to be of a different nature than governmental power does not 
controvert the fact that both are formally in the same position vis-
a-vis the Constitution. Thus, the legitimate claims of neither religion 
5. See Freeman, supra note 4. 
6. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First 
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I, 13 (1965). See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The Balancing of 
Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1961); Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145 (1959) (Justice Black, dissenting). 
7. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 879-81 (1963); id. at 879: "[S]uppression of belief, opinion, and expression is an 
affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature." 
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nor government assume an a priori precedence over those of the 
other. 
At the other end of the philosophical spectrum is the restrictive 
theory of the free exercise clause, which gives conclusive deference 
to the legislative judgment for all but the most flagrant interferences 
with religious freedom. Given a legitimate governmental end, the 
function of courts is said to be merely to ascertain whether the legis-
lature "could in reason have enacted such a law."8 A less sophisti-
cated version of this theory is frequently encountered in state court 
decisions: once the statute or ordinance is found to curb religious 
"action" as opposed to "belief," the role of courts is reduced to up-
holding the law as a valid exercise of state police power to regulate 
safety, health, morals, and welfare.9 However, the Constitution is 
concerned with permissible legislative means as well as permissible 
ends.10 
An analysis of the free exercise clause need not begin with any 
slogans or political philosophies. Rather, we must seek solutions in 
the realm of principles that are somewhat less abstract-principles 
capable both of accurately defining the various interests involved in 
a given free exercise claim and of weighing them properly. As the 
following discussion will show, such a goal has not yet been fully at-
tained. 
B. Current Free Exercise Doctrine 
Courts and commentators have offered various tests and distinc-
tions as rules of decision in free exercise cases, but these tests are 
either artificial, productive of inconsistent results, or incapable of 
explaining the true policies behind the free exercise clause. Worse, 
the tests offered to date involve blatantly subjective attempts to 
balance governmental and religious policies without defining the 
real interests in controversy. 
I. Prohibitions and Compulsions 
It would hardly be satisfactory to decide a free exercise case by 
simply characterizing the activity affected by state action as either 
8. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (compul-
sory flag-salute case) Gustice Frankfurter, dissenting); cf. Kurland, supra note 2, at 7. 
9. E.g., Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942). 
10. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hammett, The Homogenized 
Wall, 53 A.B.A.J. 929, 932-33 (1967) (the establishment clause forbids the state from 
using religious means to achieve secular ends); cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 6. One of 
the main theses of this Article is that even with respect to secular means used to 
achieve secular goals, some means are more permissible than others. Sherbert v. 
Verner, ll74 U.S. ll98 (1963). 
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"religion," which is therefore protected, or "nonreligion," which is 
the proper subject of state power. Yet, the use of such simplistic 
categories has a long history in free exercise law. The first "pure" 
free exercise case, Reynolds v. United States,11 upheld a bigamy con-
viction against a Mormon who practiced polygamy. Chief Justice 
Waite-referring to a statement by Thomas Jefferson that the legis-
lative powers of government reach action alone and not opinions--
concluded: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere 
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation 
of social duties or subversive of good order."12 Underlying this de-
limitation of religious liberty is the fear that to permit a criminal 
defendant to excuse his unlawful act because of his religious belief 
"would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief su-
perior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself."13 That is good rhetoric, but it avoids 
the problem of examining the policies underlying the free exercise 
clause in order to determine what is lawful religion in the constitu-
tional sense. The belief-action dichotomy does not necessarily follow 
either from the above reference to Jefferson or from another state-
ment by him cited in Reynolds: "It is time enough for the rightful 
purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when prin-
ciples break out into overt acts against peace and good order."14 At 
worst, this statement is ambiguous; at best, it appears to suggest some-
thing akin to a clear-and-present-danger test.15 Most important, the 
distinction between religious belief and action ignores the reality of 
a religion which is seriously practiced.16 Since almost every mani-
festation of religion that is cognizable by the state can be labelled "ac-
tion," a literal application of the belief-action dichotomy would ef-
11. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
12. 98 U.S. at 164. 
13. 98 U.S. at 167. 
14. 98 U.S. at 163. 
15. Thus, the Court, speaking of Reynolds in 1963, could state: "The [religiously 
motivated] conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial 
threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States • • • ." 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). The Supreme Court of 1878 had a rather 
culture-bound, not to say intolerant, conception of nonconforming religions. See 
Freeman, supra note 4, at 825; cf. the "modem" concept of religion expressed in 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
16. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 868-69, 239 P.2d 545, 550 
(1952) (dissenting opinion): 
There is rarely any need of court intervention to protect freedom to believe, 
since there are not many ways in which a state, even if it would, could impair 
that freedom. Appellant apparently has the idea, which should not be considered 
quaint, that religion is not something which need only be thought about between 
the hours of eleven and noon on Sunday morning, but must be expressed in 
daily living. 
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fectively write the free exercise clause out of the Constitution. 
Moreover, any method of analysis so dependent upon uncritical 
characterization cannot avoid the appearance of sometimes being 
arbitrary.17 
Other distinctions have been offered as rules of decision in free 
exercise cases: activity versus passivity on the part of the religious 
believer, and harm to self versus harm to others.18 However, these 
dichotomies have not by themselves yielded wholly consistent results. 
Thus, it has been held that the state cannot compel an adult J eho-
vah's Witness to receive life-saving blood transfusions, but that the 
state can force a Christian Scientist to submit to a vaccination.19 
The religious believers in both situations are equally passive. Per-
haps the decisions can be reconciled on the ground that in the vac-
cination case a contagious disease poses a potential threat to the 
public, whereas one who allows himself to expire by natural causes 
is a danger to nobody. But the concept of harm to others only leads 
to further questions: Does harm include moral degradation, or does 
it refer only to physical injury? Does the category of "others" include 
the believer's fellow communicants, or does it denote only those 
outside of the sect? How much deference is owed to the legislature's 
lack of sensitivity to these distinctions? 
Finally, some courts have spoken of a clear-and-present-danger 
test, but this approach is used almost exclusively in health regulation 
cases. Although the clear-and-present-danger formulation has been 
employed in a case concerning religious freedom, the decision in 
the case rested upon the political core of the first amendment.20 This, 
coupled with the fact that the doctrine originated in a context of 
seditious libel,21 should warn against its relevance in areas where 
legislative objectives are more mundane: preventing fraud, con-
trolling traffic in marijuana, and maintaining health and morals. 
Moreover, although courts may pretend to weigh probabilities of 
danger, they are more likely to follow the legislative assumption that 
some danger to society exists.22 Perhaps decisive is the fear of the 
17. See Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1949) (conviction for snake-
handling affirmed, but with a statement that the law does not prevent anyone from 
believing that handling poisonous snakes is a necessary part of religious worship). 
18. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 368, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 439, 442 (1965). 
19. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 367, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 439, 442 (1965); 
Moore v. Draper, 57 S.2d 648 (Fla. 1952). 
20. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1943). 
21. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
22. Wright v. DeWitt, 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 
Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) (danger found to exist, even though no actual evidence 
thereof). 
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supposed practical and theoretical consequences if religious exemp-
tions to criminal laws and health regulations were judicially 
granted.23 
2. Legislation for the Public Good: Of "Indirect" Burdens 
Another class of cases considers the effect upon religious prac-
tices of general regulations promoting the public welfare. It has been 
suggested that where speech is involved, the result should be the 
same as in free speech cases; where speech is not the predominant 
element, courts should strive for equality of treatment with other 
religions. Thus, once a law of general applicability is found to be 
within the legislative power of the state, the courts must carve out 
no exceptions for religious believers so long as the purpose or pri-
mary effect of the statute is not to prohibit or discriminate against 
a particular religious practice.24 Moreover, where the legislature it-
self has granted a religious exemption, it must be construed to apply 
equally to all religions.25 
Unfortunately, the no-discrimination principle has been unpre-
dictably applied. In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld 
a statute which banned commercial activity on Sunday but made no 
exception in favor of those worshipping on other days.26 Appellants 
contended that the law discriminated against their religion by com-
pelling them to choose between observing a basic tenet of their faith 
and working on Saturday. On the other hand, in Sherbert v. Verner, 27 
the Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not constitu-
tionally withhold unemployment benefits from one who, for religious 
reasons, was unwilling to accept Saturday employment. As in Braun-
feld, the effect of the state requirement was to force the individual 
to choose between the practice of his religion and his employment. 
Since both cases imposed equivalent de facto burdens upon minority 
religions, the distinction, if any, between the two certainly cannot 
be made according to a no-discrimination principle. 
If discrimination is not the key to these cases, perhaps some sort 
of weighing of state interests is involved. The following passage from 
Braunfeld is suggestive: 
23. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
24. Fernandez, supra note 4, at 564-66; Kurland, supra note 2; cf. Hamil-
ton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
25. Washington Ethical Soc. v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); 
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 
(1957). See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
26. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Twenty-one of the thirty-four states having Sunday-closing 
laws do have exceptions for those wishing to worship on other days. Id. at 614 Gustice 
Brennan, dissenting). 
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), 
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If the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its 
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's 
secular goals, the statute is valid despite the indirect burden on 
religious observance unless the State may accommodate its purpose 
by means which do not impose such a burden.28 
One aspect of this test, contained in the "unless" clause, is the prin-
ciple that a given statute may be invalid if the state has an alternative 
means, less burdensome on the religion, of accomplishing the desired 
end. It seems that such an alternative-means test would be an 
appropriately value-free-hence judicial-standard for review. How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether or not this test was actually ap-
plied in either Braun/ eld or Sherbert. Although the Braunfeld Court 
did indeed mention the possibility of alternatives, it did so from the 
point of view of the legislature's rational judgment that a Sabbata-
rian exemption would seriously preclude the attainment of the 
secular goal.20 Properly expressed, the Court's real concern was with 
the legislature's freedom to select and define such secular goals. The 
Court concluded that "to strike down, without the most critical 
scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the 
exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful 
the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating 
latitude of the legislature."30 Policy-weighing was clearly apparent 
in the decision: arrayed against the "indirect burden" of making 
the practice of Mr. Braunfeld's religion "more expensive" was a 
formidable congeries of state interests, including increased economic 
efficiency through greater physical and spiritual health, opportunity 
for families and friends to gather together, and the special Sunday 
atmosphere of peace and tranquility.31 
Of course, the noncriminal burden upon appellant's religion in 
Sherbert was arguably even more indirect than it was in Braunfeld.32 
Although the Court again referred to the alternative-means qualifica-
tion, it did not rely on that test because the merely "colorable" state 
interest in preventing fraudulent claims was insubstantial: "In this 
highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion ... .' "33 
It is submitted that, insofar as courts assume the attitude of a 
28. 366 U.S. at 607. 
29. 366 U.S. at 608-09. See Fernandez, supra note 4, at 584. 
30. 366 U.S. at 605-06. 
31. 366 U.S. at 607. 
32. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417 (1963) Gustice Stewart, concurring). 
33. 374 U.S. at 406-07. 
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super-legislature, weighing tests of the kind used in these two cases 
are both confusing and susceptible to abuse. This remains true even 
when courts profess to defer to the legislature's balancing of means 
and ends. In Braunfeld the Court found the interests of the state 
to be those set forth in the companion case of McGowan v. Mary-
land;34 there, however, the interests asserted were intended merely 
to demonstrate a secular purpose for Sunday-closing laws under the 
establishment clause. But, while it is one thing to show a secular 
purpose by means of ex post facto reasoning about state "interests," 
it is quite another to conclude that somehow such interests outweigh 
a claim premised upon the free exercise clause, or that a Sabbatarian 
exemption would not be a viable alternative to a Sunday-only-closing 
law. In sum, the Court in Braunfeld and Sherbert gave the unfortu-
nate impression that it was rationalizing and speculating about poli-
cies without any standard to evaluate the strength of competing 
claims. 
The folly of a policy-weighing approach is best illustrated by two 
recent cases in which religious adherents were required to partici-
pate in judicial proceedings contrary to their convictions. In People 
v. Woodruf!,35 a witness was compelled to testify before a grand jury 
investigating alleged use of narcotics, despite the witness' claim that 
her Hindu belief counseled against testifying because it was wrong 
to harm others. The New York intermediate court cited Sherbert 
and assumed that a balancing test was called for: "We balance, then, 
the interest of the individual right of religious worship against the 
interest of the state which is sought to be enforced.''36 Of course, the 
court concluded that the claim of the state was more compelling: 
The community is entitled to the assistance and information of its 
members in seeking out and controlling the commission of crime . 
. . . If it were otherwise, the fabric of society might be pierced and 
fatally rent by a religious belief sincerely held by an individual in 
action or inaction damaging to the continued existence of peace and 
order in the community.37 
Whatever one may think about the result of Woodruff, it must be 
conceded that the New York court invoked general policy considera-
tions to obscure the fact that the witness was not herself charged with 
34. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Court quoted Blackstone (4 COMMENTARIES 63), at 434: 
"It humanizes, by the help of conversation and society, the manners of the lower 
classes; which would otherwise degenerate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfishness 
of spirit; it enables the industrious workman to pursue his occupation in the ensuing 
week with health and cheerfulness." 
35. 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), afj'd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 
159 (1968). 
36. 26 App. Div. 2d at 238, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789. 
37. 26 App. Div. 2d at 238-39, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90. 
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any crime and to ignore the alternative of making some accommoda-
tion to her religious claim. It might have been possible, for example, 
to compel her testimony only after it was concluded that no one 
else could be found to testify concerning the same matter. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court provided an even more unsatisfactory opinion 
in In re ]enison,38 where the religious adherent was held in contempt 
of court for refusing to serve on a jury. After noting that the burden 
upon defendant's free exercise was slight, the court proceeded to 
give a dissertation about the overwhelming interest of society in the 
jury system. 
Such experience with the balancing test tempts one to generalize 
that: (1) the state always wins; (2) courts scarcely notice the religious 
interest, much less attempt to analyze it; (3) courts do not really 
analyze the state's interest either; (4) neither courts nor attorneys 
accurately delineate the real issues; and, (5) judicial opinions pro-
ceed in terms of policy rather than more justiciable standards. Al-
though accepting the necessity for some kind of "weighing" test, I 
categorically reject the "ad hoc balancing" approach as being arbi-
trary, useless, and too insensitive to the special competencies of 
legislatures and the judiciary. The appropriate role of the courts is 
not to balance policies-that, presumably, has already been done by 
the drafters of the Constitution, by basic social values, and by the 
legislatures-but rather to define interests of both religion and 
government in terms from which it is possible to generalize about 
future disputes. 
It has not been the primary purpose of this brief survey to 
criticize the results of the decided cases-the outcome of the Sunday-
closing-Iaw cases, for instance, is certainly defensible.39 Nor has the 
intention been to reject all of the tests and distinctions that have 
been offered by courts and commentators. Rather, this critique has 
been directed toward the point that there is neither a set of principles 
which allocates rules of decision to particular types of fact situations, 
nor objective criteria for assigning weights to religious and govern-
mental interests in various contexts. 
II. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
We start with the notion that since religious freedom is not re-
lated to the governing process or (except perhaps indirectly) to a 
38. 265 Minn. 96, 99-102, 120 N.W.2d 515, 518-19 (1963). The decision was soon 
reversed by the Supreme Court, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (per curiam). 
39. See Note, State Sunday Laws and the Religious Guarantees of the Federal Con-
stitution, 73 HARV. L. REv. 729 (1960). For a general criticism of the result see Barron, 
Sunday in North America, 79 HARV. L. REv. 42, 52-53 (1965). 
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policy of unifying American society, the Brennan-Meiklejohn social-
utility test40-which focuses on the value to the political process of 
any form of expression-is inappropriate. Therefore, if one accepts 
the premise that under the free exercise clause the practice of reli-
gion is an end in itself, the search for values and policies underlying 
that clause should begin with an analysis of religion as such-spe-
cifically, how it satisfies the psychological, spiritual, and social needs 
of its adherents. Since viewing religious freedom as an end in itself 
means that it is unrelated to the structure and powers of govern-
ment, a discussion of the scope of the free exercise clause must not 
stop with an analysis of religion alone. There must also be an ex-
amination of situations in which government can and should-and 
the areas in which it need not-accommodate religion. Although the 
two inquiries are analytically distinct, certain values and lines of 
argument are common to both. 
A. Interests of Religion 
Although religious "action" is susceptible to various forms of 
governmental intervention, it has been conceded that religious 
"belief" is absolutely protected.41 But since the belief-action dis-
tinction cannot be uncritically accepted,42 the present task is to de-
termine what kinds of religious action should be protected, first of 
all, from the point of view of religion itself. 
I. Traditional Judicial Attitudes Toward Controversies 
Involving Religion 
Courts deciding free exercise cases have been reluctant to relate 
religious doctrine to the decision of particular disputes. In Watson 
v. ]ones,43 for instance, the Supreme Court faced the question of 
which party in a denominational schism was entitled to certain 
church property; it held that the dispute had to be resolved by the 
appropriate governing organ of the church itself, rather than by a 
judicial inquiry into the doctrinal purity of the competing parties. 
The Court, reading the free exercise and establishment clauses to-
gether, stated that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to 
40. See authorities cited, note 6 supra. I do not, however, mean to imply that 
Justice Brennan himself would apply the social-utility test to the free exercise area. 
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
41. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). See text accompanying 
notes 11-17 supra. 
42. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 826 (1958). 
See Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 566-67, 587 
(1963); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 
7 (1961); text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. 
43. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871). 
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the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."44 In contrast 
to the Chancellor in England, moreover, American judges have no 
competence in ecclesiastical law or theology; where the subject of 
the suit is ecclesiastical, the secular courts have no "jurisdiction."45 
As a matter of legal interpretation, however, the stricture against 
inquiry into religious doctrine and organization should be severely 
limited to situations like that at issue in Watson v. Jones-where 
both parties base their claims on religious factors. The typical free 
exercise case involves competing religious and governmental in-
terests; since a court must accept jurisdiction and does in fact weigh 
the interest of the state, it seems that procedural fairness requires 
that equal attention be given to the interest of religion. An examina-
tion of theology in the usual free exercise case would not constitute 
an attempt to determine true doctrine or heresy, but would merely 
be a necessary first step in analyzing the religious claim.46 
One positive approach to an analysis of religious action looks to 
the place which a particular tenet has in the total scheme of the reli-
gion. A form of cultural anthropology, such a method claims to be 
value-neutral. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,47 Justice Douglas so an-
alyzed the role of selling and distributing Watchtower Society litera-
ture in the religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses. He found these 
activities to be in reponse to a categorical commandment by God 
and to be as important to Jehovah's Witnesses as worship and preach-
ing are to the religions with which most Americans are familiar. 
Although Justice Douglas correctly looked at the religion as a whole 
rather than the subjective zeal of its individual practitioners, he did 
44. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728. This language was quoted in Presbyterian Church in 
the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 37 
U.S.L.W. 4107 Gan. 27, 1969), where the Court held that the first amendment, as 
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, prohibits a state court from 
reviewing a decision of a church tribunal and awarding title of disputed property to a 
local church on the ground that the actions of the general church amounted "'to a 
fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the 
[general church], so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the pur-
poses for which the [general church) was founded,'" 37 U.S.L.W. at 4107. 
45. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729, 733. 
46. With United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), this stricture against inquiry 
into religious doctrine was finally put to rest, as was the notion that judges are in-
competent by nature in the domain of theology. In only one area-fraud in adver-
tising and selling religious therapy-has the heresy issue arisen. In United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), the Court attempted to side-step the question whether 
or not the religious claim was false by relying on a test of intent to defraud. Al-
though it might seem that the truth or falsity of the religious claim could have been 
tested objectively, [see 322 U.S. at 89 (Chief Justice Stone, dissenting)), even that 
approach would be futile, since the victims might have viewed the "reality" differ-
ently. In that event, such an objective test would effectively declare the beliefs of the 
victims to be heresy. See 322 U.S. at 93-95 Gustice Jackson, dissenting). 
47. !119 U.S. 105, 109 (1943). 
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not make clear how his method avoids the dilemma of either con-
ceding that religion is what the sect says it is, or comparing the prac-
tice to some form of religious activity known to Judaeo-Christian 
tradition.48 
A more fruitful approach is present in those cases which recognize 
that some religious tenets may not be compelled by the religion, but 
instead are merely "believed in"; such tenets can be regulated by 
government without disrupting the core meaning of the religion it-
self.49 Although this principle is not often explicitly set forth, it does 
appear to have influenced the results of some cases. To take but one 
example, the duty of a minister to castigate sin while preaching the 
Gospel to his congregation would not seem to require that he use 
obscenities offensive to the congregation's sensibilities.50 Although the 
principle which attempts to distinguish between tenets that are 
beliefs and those that are compelled practices has frequently been 
passed over, 51 it is a step in the right direction and will be elaborated 
upon in the analysis of religious action proposed below. 
Finally, there is the question of the degree to which courts are 
willing to inquire into the sincerity with which a particular in-
dividual holds a belief. In religious fraud cases, the sincerity of the 
belief is the key issue-even the essence of the charge. 52 There the 
expressed view is that "[i]n such an intensely personal area ... the 
claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious 
48. Such a method merely succeeds in reintroducing elements of subjectivity. See 
People v. Ashley, 184 App. Div. 520, 172 N.Y.S. 282 (1918) (defendant, whether a 
"medium" or a "fortuneteller," held not to be like an Old Testament prophet); 
11.IcMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922) (based upon the judges' ex• 
perience with religion, fortunetelling held not to fall within that category). Although 
cultural anthropology may have value in deciding what religion is in the first place, 
it cannot tell us what is lawful religion. See Note, Right To Practice Black Muslim 
Tenets in State Prison, 75 HARV. L. REv. 837, 838-39 (1962), in which the religious 
and political components of the Black Muslim faith are, with some difficulty, sorted 
out. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 Gustice Clark for the majority), 188 
Gustice Douglas, concurring) (1965). But see Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 
573 (1944) (issue is whether or not practice is "protected religion'). 
49. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), is so interpreted by the California 
Supreme Court. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (1964). For 
cases supporting the converse (that "essential" practices therefore have a higher status), 
see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); People v. Woody, supra; State v. 
Delaney, I N.J. Misc. 619, 122 A. 890 (1923). 
50. See Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.'W. 1129 (1918). 
51. See United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612, 613 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (reversing 
contempt conviction for refusal to serve on a jury, even though the judge could see 
no connection between the refusal and defendant's religion). At the other extreme, 
statutes banning the handling of poisonous snakes have been upheld, despite the fact 
that the practice appeared to be central to the defendant's sect. E.g., Lawson 
v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942). 
52. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). See People v. Ashley, 184 App. 
Div. 520, 172 N.Y.S. 282 (1918). 
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faith must be given great weight."03 Yet, in many instances, and 
sometimes without explaining why, courts are openly skeptical of a 
particular claimant's sincerity.154 The trial court should be required 
to make a finding of the existence, but not the degree, of the 
claimant's sincerity; at a minimum, such an affirmative finding seems 
necessary in order to lay the basis for an individual's standing to 
challenge governmental action under the free exercise clause.55 Once 
standing has been established, however, the question of sincerity 
need concern the court no longer; more formalistic and objective 
criteria should then be brought into play. 
2. An Analysis of Religious Action: The Theoretical Framework 
We turn now from a discussion of traditional judicial attitudes 
to a theoretical exposition of the nature of religious behavior-one 
that is derived from sociological principles governing action in gen-
eral. Parenthetically, if these theoretical explanations seem to be 
confusing or difficult to grasp, the reader should be consoled by the 
thought that they are not so important as the results which follow; 
these results hopefully accord with common sense and experience. 
The various religious interests will be ranked according to criteria 
internal to religious systems as such, instead of according to Ameri-
can social and political values-although there is actually a striking 
correspondence between the two realms. In short, a frankly sociolog-
ical approach to the religious interest is being urged in order to 
eliminate extrinsic value preferences from the constitutional weigh-
ing process. An analytical paradigm of such generality as to outline 
the essential functional imperatives of any system of behavior will 
be applied in order specifically to describe the major categories of 
religious action. Such an objective approach accords with the notion 
that the protection afforded by the free exercise clause should not 
vary according to the belief contents of various religions.56 
a. Sociological principles governing action as such.51 The func-
53. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). 
54. Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. App. 1963): State v. Bullard, 
267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (alternative holding); cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. II (1905). 
55. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); In re Grady, 61 Cal. 
2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). 
56. This point is constantly reiterated by Justice Douglas; see, e.g., Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 4II-12 (1963) (concurring opinion). 
57. The main points in this subsection are taken from Talcott Parsons, An Outline 
of the Social System, in I THEORIES OF SocIETY 30, 36-40 (1961). The following out-
line of the theory of action from a sociological perspective is extremely condensed, 
partly from necessity, but partly because it is also felt that the important point for 
the reader to grasp is not the mechanics of a particular sociological theory but rather 
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tional imperatives of any system of behavior are derived from re-
sponses to problems posed both by the internal environment and 
by the external environment. At the same time, a system can relate 
to these problems either in universalistic or particularistic terms. A 
universalistic mode is one which is founded upon some generaliza-
ble principle; for example, to adapt, one must be "efficient" or 
"flexible" or "powerful"-predicates which can be validly applied 
to any subject. The particularistic mode, on the other hand, focuses 
on the specific subject and its identity; particularistic qualities are 
"given" or are conceived of as being ends in themselves. The uni-
versalistic-particularistic dichotomy is somewhat like the distinction 
between the internal and external environment, except that the lat-
ter refers to activities of the system and its components, while the 
former refers to the way in which the system conceives of, and eval-
uates, itself. The combination of the internal-external and univer-
salistic-particularistic dichotomies yields a fourfold paradigm (figure 
1) containing four categories of action conceived of as functional im-


















The function of pattern maintenance involves maintaining the 
stability of the limits of the system itself by providing patterns which 
give it meaning. Integration relates to the mutual adjustment of sub-
units within the system in order to organize the smooth functioning 
of the system as a whole. The function of goal attainment is de-
fined in terms of the directional flexibility needed to lessen the 
tension between the needs of the system and the varying conditions 
the fact that the categories of religious action do have a logical and analytical (as 
opposed to ad hoc empirical) derivation. The value of such a system lies in its 
capacity to "rank" its own "interests" according to its functional needs as a system. 
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in the environment that bear upon the satisfaction of such needs. 
The function of adaptation arises from the problem of allocating 
limited means to a multiplicity of goals and the resulting calculation 
of sacrifices and gains incidental to the attainment of those goals. 
It should be evident that within the internal environment, the 
pattern maintenance function is universalistic while the integration 
function is particularistic. As the source of meaning for the system 
as a whole, the symbolic or rational contents of the pattern main-
tenance function, viewed as a subsystem, are by their form valid for 
all systems of a similar type. That is, statements about meaning are 
universalistic because they relate the unit (a sect) to some larger 
concept (such as goodness, truth, membership, unity) which is the 
source of meaning. This is done either by placing the unit into some 
larger frame of reference or by asserting that the unit is the only 
unit which possesses a certain desirable quality (the implication 
being that other units could have this quality, but, since they do not, 
they are inferior). For example, the doctrine, "Jesus Christ is the 
Son of God," is a universalistic source of meaning for a Christian 
sect. The word "Jesus Christ" is the particularistic reference related 
to the sect by the assumption that "I belong to a group which believes 
in Jesus"; the word "Son" is a lead-in to the concept of God, who 
has all the attributes of goodness and truth. 
The four categories of the functional paradigm are neither static 
nor mutually exclusive; a given system by its nature may change, 
break down, or maintain its present boundaries. Also, among the 
various functional categories, each viewed as a subsystem in its own 
right, there are various inputs and outputs; some of those for the 
religious action system are illustrated in figure 2. Finally, the de-
scribed system has an evolutionary component expressed in terms 
of the relative presence or absence of "functional differentiation" 
among the subsystems. 
b. A functional paradigm of the religious action system.58 The 
subsystems or categories of the religious system, which are derived 
from the functional paradigm governing action as such, are shown 
in figure 2.59 It must be kept in mind that this is a theoretical scheme, 
and the categories are not derived from empirical generalization. 
Rather, they attempt to specify the elements of religious action in 
58. Much of the following analysis is adapted from Bellah, Some Suggestions for 
the Systematic Study of Religion (mimeo) (permission kindly granted by the author) 
(1955). It would be very difficult to separate Bellah's analysis from my own modifica-
tions, but any deviations from theoretical consistency are attributable to me. 
59. Adapted, with omissions and modifications, from Bellah, supra note 58, at 10, 
13, 14. 
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terms of the functional imperatives described above. The religious 
system is defined briefly as that which relates values having to do 
with "ultimate meaning," as elaborated in a system of culture, to a 


















The pattern maintenance subsystem refers to the pattern of belief 
and symbols of ultimate meaning or concern. Theology, dogmatics, 
and the elaboration of symbols for liturgy are found here. 
The integrative problem involves organizing a coherent system 
of religious practice and belief for the multitude of members within 
a given religious community who are confronted with varying social 
or psychological strains. This is called the religious therapy sub-
system. Starting with notions of alienation or sin, the aim of this 
subsystem is to provide salvation-a restoration of spiritual whole-
ness or health-to the members of the sect by means of "saving" 
techniques such as sacrament, the power of faith, and acts of con-
fession or charity. 
60. This is a good place to emphasize that I am discussing religion as a social 
system. It might be objected that the first amendment has largely to do with indi-
vidual liberty and personal conscience, and therefore that my analysis is irrelevant. 
But that is to assert the conclusion before the reasoning. All I am saying at this 
point is that religion should be analyzed from the point of view of a social system 
because of legally relevant considerations of objectivity, analytical consistency, case of 
application, and efficiency. Moreover, a sociological analysis is not irrelevant even if 
one accepts an individualistic interpretation of the first amendment, because (I) the 
social system itself specifies "roles"-sets of expectations held by the social unit and 
other social actors concerning the individual's identity and performance; and (2) the 
social system interacts with the individual himself on the level of personal motiva-
tion and moral conscience. 
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The goal attainment subsystem is referred to as worship. The 
functional problem here arises from the need to reinforce commit-
ment to the aims of the sect. Ceremony and ritual are the chief 
mechanisms by which the group defines itself in terms of action as 
opposed to pure doctrine; liturgy can be viewed as symbolic of the 
individual's identification with group values and needs. The ritual 
may relate both to the natural environment (in the form of sym-
pathetic magic) or to the spiritual realm (in propitiation of the 
Divinity). The output from worship to the therapy subsystem is the 
facility for sacrament, and the output to the ethical action subsystem 
is sermon-the public commitment to ethical action. 
Finally, the adaptive function concerns relating religion to 
everyday life by means of ethical action. On the most general level, 
this function regulates the balance of public versus in-group com-
mitment. The aim of this subsystem is the achievement of moral 
acceptability in religious terms by means of the actual performance 
of ethical acts. The output from ethical action to the therapy sub-
system is acts of confession or charity-"justification by works"-
while the output to the worship subsystem is proselytization-the 
obtaining of new members for the religious group. Ethical action 
may range from the type of evangelism practiced by Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, to various optional forms of charity, to actions like polygamy, 
the religious content of which is not immediately apparent to out-
siders. 
The above fourfold classification is inherent in mature religions. 
Conversely, "primitive" religion is defined sociologically not by 
the content of the belief system or by particular strange tenets, but 
rather by the absence of differentiation among the four functional 
subsystems. On a different level of analysis, a primitive religion is 
also characterized by the absence of differentiation betv1een the 
religion itself and other social and cultural systems, particularly 
kinship, political organization, law, role-playing, science, and artistic 
expression. In analyzing a given free exercise claim, one should view 
the sect to which the claimant belongs in its entirety. If the religious 
subsystems cannot be distinguished, the religion should be charac-
terized as primitive. If the tenet in question is only a relatively 
minor aspect of the religion-a residue of or regression to a prior 
stage of social evolution-it should, for purposes of this analysis, be 
considered in terms of whichever of the four functional subsystems 
it most closely resembles. To take some examples, polygamy may be 
indicative of a fusion of religion with social and kinship organiza-
tion. Yet it is doubtful whether the practice of polygamy alone could 
696 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:679 
characterize the Mormon Church of the nineteenth century as being 
a primitive religion, especially since the ethical aspect of polygamy 
completely overshadowed whatever other religious functions could 
be attributable to it. On the other hand, such practices as snake 
handling, seance, and use of peyote for worship appear to be primi-
tive in the sense that various religious phenomena-liturgy, sacra-
ment, worship, and evangelism-are combined in various degrees 
and proportions in one practice. Nevertheless, of these examples only 
peyote worship, since it constitutes practically the entire religion 
for those American Indians who practice it, can be clearly said to 
be a primitive religion. 
3. Legal Consequences 
a. Primitive religions. A primitive religion in which the sub-
systems are undifferentiated should be considered in a separate 
category for legal purposes in two circumstances: when the entire 
religion-not merely one of its tenets-can be characterized as primi-
tive, and when the primitive sect is, from the point of view of social 
structure, isolated and self-contained. Given a legitimate govern-
mental interest as well as a clear political commitment to advance 
"civilization," a primitive sect should not be given any blanket 
exemption from secular law-even if that law is designed ultimately 
to erode the traditional religion. Unfortunately, the ability to 
recognize a primitive religion does not help us to determine whether 
it is entitled to more or less protection than that afforded to other 
religions. But while this theoretical issue is perplexing, the fact 
remains that today primitive religions in the sociological sense are 
found almost exclusively among the American Indians, who histori-
cally have stood in a special relationship with the federal govern-
ment. 61 
61. Should the federal government decide to implement a policy of assimilation 
with regard to the Indian through the enactment of social legislation, then the In-
dians' free exercise rights should be accorded neither a greater nor a lesser status 
than the rights of other citizens. As to general regulations and criminal prohibitions 
bearing upon religious freedom, the appropriate rule should defer to the decision 
of the duly constituted tribal government in the case of on-reservation activity not 
of a physically violent nature. This approach corresponds with the sociological princi-
ple that the social-cohesion interest of the sect may be quite intense, and indeed 
the practice with respect to crimes or disputes on the reservations is very nearly the 
one proposed. See Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818 
(1968); cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 594 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). 
Such a principle need not be based on doubtful notions of sovereignty; rather it is 
merely an acknowledgment of the reality of a unique historical and social condition 
tolerated by both the polity and the Indians themselves. Eventually, however, it 
should suffer the fate of the separate-but-equal doctrine as (and if) a national policy 
of assimilation is adopted and implemented. 
On the other hand, if the tribe itself suppresses the free exercise of religion, the 
protection offered by the Constitution should not be waived just because the state 
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b. Mature religions. The thesis of this Article is that the belief 
and therapy subsystems of a mature religion should be absolutely 
protected by the free exercise clause, that the worship subsystem 
should also be protected so long as there is no demonstrable harm 
outside of the worship group or severe physical injury within it, 
and that the ethical action subsystem should receive a much lesser 
degree of protection. The degree of protection afforded should de-
pend upon what function the religious action performs rather than 
upon the content of the motivating belief. Moreover, functional 
analysis should take precedence even when a given religion places a 
high valuation upon a particular form of ethical action. Thus, in the 
Murdock case discussed above, it appears that Justice Douglas was 
seduced into finding that distribution of religious literature on the 
street "occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as 
does worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits"62 by 
the fact that the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves placed such high 
value on this form of evangelism. But according to the sociological 
analysis proposed here, the practice in question clearly falls within 
the category of ethical action, and the degree of legal immunity 
afforded should depend upon that functional characterization. 
The belief and therapy subsystems should receive absolute 
protection because they relate by definition to the internal ordering 
of the religious system and to the individual's orientation and com-
mitment thereto. As such, belief and communion are of maximum 
concern to the members of the sect and of minimal concern to 
everybody else.63 Moreover, on a psychological level, to impinge 
upon an individual's conception of ultimate meaning, to interfere 
with his sacrament, or to compel him to adopt a permanent condition 
of sinfulness is to disrupt his most fundamental religious convictions. 
On the other hand, worship and ethical action are both forms of 
performance which necessarily entail social consequences. However, 
the fact that worship is particularistic rather than universalistic 
performance explains why worship ought to receive greater protec-
tion than ethical action: the social conduct involved in worship 
relates, by definition, solely to members of the cult and is therefore 
less likely to harm outsiders. Moreover, worship is the primary outlet 
for expressing one's religious commitment publicly in collective 
condones separatism; cf. Colliflower v. Garland, !142 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). But see 
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 372 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). 
62. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943). 
63. Of course, the beliefs and sacraments of a religious group may well concern 
others very intensely, but only on the level of their own contrary beliefs and con-
science. I do not think that this level of concern is a "social" interest requiring gov-
ernmental protection. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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ceremony and prayer; at the same time it provides the most con-
spicuous focus for the social identity of the religious group. Finally, 
worship provides a key facility for the therapy subsystem-the 
paraphernalia for sacrament. These characteristics are inherent in 
worship as an analytical concept, and exist independent of the 
value which the religion itself may place upon its goal attainment 
function. In sum, the worship function, in addition to being a 
primary means of expressing cult values and needs,64 is the sine qua 
non of religion as a social organization. 
Ethical action presents an entirely different situation. Although 
the norm that sanctions a given ethical practice may be of general 
applicability, the particular ethical practice itself may be only one 
of many possible derivations from such norm. This may explain 
why many ethical tenets appear to have no necessary logical rela-
tionship to the core of the underlying belief system, but merely seem 
to be derived from social, economic, or political origins. 611 Indeed, 
there is a feeling that many religiously motivated ethical practices 
are simply not "religious" within the common understanding of 
that word. Ethical acts are directed to man, not to God or some 
other core concept of a religion (except indirectly), while the em-
phasis of religion is the reverse.66 These observations all accord with 
the concept that ethical action, the adaptive subsystem of religion, 
should be the lowest subsystem on the scale of priorities. Thus, 
since particular ethical practices have no necessary logical or onto-
logical relationship to the rest of the system, it would seem that any 
sect frustrated by environmental hostility to one of its ethical prac-
tices could adapt to societal pressure by changing the offending 
practice. The change could occur without necessitating any funda-
mental alterations in the other more "religious" functional sub-
systems.67 I do not suggest that a religion must, in any normative 
64. See Fernandez, supra note 42, at 587. Giannella, in The Religious Liberty 
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1419-21 (1967), also points out the distinctions 
between types of religious action. However, his criterion seems to be merely the 
importance of a tenet to a particular religion on a sect-by-sect basis; therefore, the 
evangelism of the Jehovah's Witnesses would be as protected as is sacrament generally, 
65. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy); United States v. 
Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958) (refusal to limit production of grain); Newman 
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S. Car. 1966) (refusal to serve Negroes 
in restaurant). 
66. This notion is expressed by the proposition that the essence of religion is 
"belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation." United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1930) (Chief Justice 
Hughes, dissenting). 
67. For example, the Mormons changed their teachings in respect to polygamy in 
1890, the same year that the Supreme Court, in Davis v. :Beason, 133 U.S. 333, upheld 
a voting ban against advocates of polygamy; see Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 
14, 16 n.1 (1946); :Bellah, supra note 58, at 11, 34. 
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sense, undergo such an evolutionary process; I merely emphasize that 
the standards for adaptation are "neutral." Therefore, a given 
religion need not, in view of the variety of options available for 
resolving conflicts with secular society, put all of its emphasis upon 
any particular moral tenet. Although it is true that a religious sect 
may so overcommit itself to a particular ethical practice in the 
face of social or political hostility that it ultimately ceases to be 
viable, no tears should be shed for such sociologically inflexible 
entities. 
Nevertheless, in the short run, state interference with religiously 
derived moral tenets may acutely impinge upon religion, particularly 
when the result is to compel action or abstention which is defined as 
sinful by the therapy subsystem. When this occurs, religious ethical 
action merits some protection by the first amendment.68 But where 
the therapy subsystem itself specifies that compulsion or an absence 
of intent to violate the moral norm is an excuse for the act or omis-
sion constituting "sin," the need for this protection is obviously 
lessened. 
The practical advantages of using this functional paradigm in 
the legal analysis of a free exercise claim are numerous. First, this 
approach obviates the necessity of gauging the degree of emphasis 
that a particular religion attaches to a given practice and the relative 
strength of an individual's subjective beliefs. Second, such an analysis 
ranks religious interests and yet remains value-neutral; that is, the 
content of a belief is irrelevant and practices are not judged accord-
ing to standards derived from Judaeo-Christian or American secular 
norms. At the same time, it should be relatively easy for a court to 
ascertain the formal distinctions among belief, sacrament, worship, 
and ethical action. 00 Where ethical action itself is under attack, a 
court can easily determine whether or not the state sanction results, 
as a matter of principle for the sect, in a condition of sinfulness for 
the believer, taking into account the doctrinal ability of the therapy 
subsystem to resolve the dilemma. 
The fourfold classification outlined above accords with common 
sense and experience; therefore, judges need not master sociological 
theory. Not the least of the benefits of the proposed approach is that 
it is capable of rationalizing the mainstream of decided cases while 
clarifying elements that ought to be considered in future con-
troversies. 
68. Fernandez, supra note 42, at 564-66, seems to say that religious actions not 
involving worship or sacrament should receive no immunity, at least from the criminal 
law, except where another specific first amendment right can be invoked. 
69. Courts should also be able to identify exotic tenets which fall into one of these 
categories and primitive religions as such. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
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B. Interests of Government 
I. Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Action 
Certain constitutional concepts that bear upon the relationship 
between government and individuals, interpersonal associations, and 
intragroup behavior serve to limit the governmental interest when 
dealing with religious groups in the same manner as when govern-
ment seeks to affect other social units. The same jurisprudential, 
social, and practical considerations which tend to weaken the state 
interest may also reinforce the distinction between worship and 
ethical action and thus bear upon an evaluation ot the religious 
claim itself. 
a. The individual-private thoughts and actions. The heart 
of individual liberty is freedom from direct governmental coercion 
in the realm of ideas, beliefs, and opinions. 70 It matters not whether 
these ideas are religious, ethical, economic, philosophical, scientific, 
or political in nature. In other words, the "internal environment" 
of the individual is beyond the pale of direct governmental inter-
vention. The obvious corollary of this proposition is that the in-
dividual has considerable liberty in respect to the consumption of 
ideas originating in his external environment;71 part of the penum-
70. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1943); Emerson, 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963). 
71. These statements underlie the basic evolutionary trend in the area of obscenity 
law. The Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), rejected an 
all-encompassing definition of protected speech in terms of personal belief and e.x-
pression in favor of the "redeeming social value" test, which in turn is founded on 
the notion of the social utility of exchanging ideas of political consequence. The 
Court, however, implicitly admitted that immunity from state prohibition was avail-
able to advocacy of nonconforming moral values and for expressions of purely artistic 
value. These expressions, too, can be said to have social, if not political, value in the 
broad sense. Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); 
Monaghan, Obscenity 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenit:-,• Per 
Quad, 76 YALE L.J. 127 (1966); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 
1960 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 1, 16. See Emerson, supra note 70, at 880. Justice Brennan's dis-
cussion of Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), in The Supreme Court and the 
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I, 18-19 (1965), 
suggests that his "general theory" of the first amendment revolves around a notion 
of social utility. 
It would then seem that the proper theory on which to base the legislature's power 
to control obscenity should be "sociological" and should therefore refer to the mech• 
anisms and manner of its communication instead of its expressive purposes. Since 
almost any material would pass muster under the "utterly without redeeming social 
value" test as laid down in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), the "pandering" analysis set forth 
in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), which focuses upon the manner 
of distribution of the material, is now of dominant interest. See Supreme Court Note, 
The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 125, 186-94 (1966). I interpret the 
new test to be open invitation by the Court to legislatures to frame their obscenity 
laws according to the sociological theory proposed in the text. It has been strenuously 
urged that government has no power to ban pornography from those who desire to be 
February 1969J Free Exercise of Religion 701 
bra of the first amendment is the right of the individual to acquire 
knowledge or obtain exposure to ideology.72 Thus, a state cannot 
prevent a parochial school from teaching modern foreign lan-
guages, 73 nor can it force all children to attend only state schools.74 
The state has traditionally asserted its interest in the area of 
private conduct outside the realm of ideas only with respect to 
attempted suicide and consumption of alcohol or drugs. Yet the 
trend has clearly been away from attaching criminal sanctions to 
these actions.75 Undoubtedly, one reason for this trend is a recog-
exposed to it. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUll!. 
L. REv. 391 (1963), seems to say this without feeling any necessity to invoke the first 
amendment. Monaghan, supra, at 138, rejects the substantive due process implications 
of such a position, but agrees that the interest of the state here is weak and should 
yield to any asserted constitutional right. Id. at 139-40. Even Henkin, supra, at 413 
n.68, admits that the state has the power to act against "public" obscenity. Of course, 
the state is said to have power to ban obscenity only because it has been decided that 
the latter is not "protected speech" under the first amendment. But as a test to be ap-
plied to printed matter or private behavior, this rule is suspect. This can be seen by a 
reading of the following passage from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
571-72 (1942), which Justice Brennan relied upon in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 485 (1957): 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
J)roblem. These include the lewd and obscene [, the profane, the libelous, and 
ihe insulting or "fighting" words and those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace]. It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality. fFootnotes omitted.] [The bracketed words are those which Justice 
Brennan chose to omit.] 
On its face, this dictum seems to refer to public utterances, as opposed to printed 
literature. Accord, Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915). If so, the 
described type of behavior would be analogous to the inciting speech that was in fact 
the matter for decision in Chaplinsky. Thus, with the original context restored, "the 
lewd and obscene" reference probably means lewd or indecent conduct. To read the 
phrase as Justice Brennan did in Roth leads to the unique conclusion that obscene 
material is the only form of speech which can be banned as such by the state, in spite 
of the fact that there is no proved connection with unlawful conduct. Monaghan, 
supra, at 132, makes all of these points. Thus, if obscene matter were restored to its 
proper place within the first amendment, a mere untested assertion by the state that 
there was some connection with overt action would not have conclusive weight. Roth, 
supra, at 508 ijustice Douglas, dissenting); cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ("gravity" of the evil). 
Consistent with focusing upon the social communication of obscenity are the deci-
sions of at least two courts which have construed their respective state obscenity laws 
so as not to cover material held solely for the personal use or enjoyment of the person 
who created it. In re Klor, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791 (1966); State v. Wetzel, 173 
Ohio St. 16, 19, 179 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1962) (dictum). 
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (dictum); Emerson, supra note 
70, at 880. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); cf. Martin v. City 
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
73. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
74. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
75. Thus, for example, under the Model Penal Code § 250.5 (Proposed Official 
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muon of the inherent futility of prohibition as a means of con-
trolling such private conduct; another reason is the feeling that a 
person who attempts suicide or consumes harmful substances is 
more likely to possess some kind of psychological disorder than to 
have an evil intent.76 And, most relevant to the religious problem, 
it has been argued with some force that suicide is simply none of 
the state's business insofar as there are no serious collateral effects 
on others.77 These considerations may have implications for the 
way in which government should relate, as a matter of policy, to 
such religious practices as drug-taking, self-immolation, and snake-
handling. Without religion, these practices would probably be con-
sidered to be symptoms of mental disturbance. Should the state act 
accordingly and "treat" these sociocultural "diseases" by education 
and social legislation rather than by criminal prosecution? Or can 
it be maintained that the state has no power at all to deal with these 
practices on the ground that they are "healthy" from a given sect's 
viewpoint? Perhaps the state has no more business saying what is 
healthy or unhealthy for a particular sect than it does in weeding 
out heresy or false opinions. 
b. Binary consensual relationships. The leading case on the 
question of binary relationships between consenting adults is Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,78 which held that a state may not proscribe 
the use of artificial birth control devices by a married couple. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court conceded that the state 
may act constitutionally in the realm of sexual morality, presum-
ably even where the regulation impinges upon the privacy of 
consenting adults. Apparently because the state itself sanctions the 
Draft, 1962) the mere state of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs is not a 
crime, except where such status constitutes a public "nuisance." The Model Code also 
fails to list attempted suicide as a crime. In respect to suicide specifically, Grenville 
Williams, in The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1958), supports this trend. 
76. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514 (1968), the Court by a five-to-four decision refused to hold that public intoxication 
was beyond the pale of the criminal law. However, five Justices seem to have agreed 
that Robinson establishes a constitutional requirement of mens rea in regard to public 
crimes-or at least that the due process clause applying the eighth amendment 
prohibits the states from defining diseases or "conditions," and, by implication, acts 
which result therefrom, as substantive crimes, presumably because such diseases, 
conditions and acts are in some sense "involuntary." 392 U.S. at 548-49 (Justice White, 
concurring), 566-67 (four Justices dissenting). 
77. "Society cannot stop a free man from committing suicide, nor should it try. 
What can be done is to make sure that the determination upon self-destruction is 
fixed and unalterable." G. "WILLIAMS, supra note 75, at 262. Thus, it cannot be said 
that the state should cease to take an interest in these matters; nevertheless, govern-
ments are gradually discarding the old heavy-handed all-or-nothing methods in favor 
of more flexible and rehabilitative solutions. 
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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matrimonial status,79 however, the line was dra1-\rn at the point at 
which state regulation interferes with marital intimacies.80 If the 
policy of the state is decisive, can the relationship between the free 
exercise clause and the intragroup affairs of a religious sect be 
analogized to the relationship between state laws sanctioning mar-
riage and the husband-wife social unit? Marriage and religious 
affiliation are similar in that they are both commonly described in 
terms of status rather than temporary unilateral or bilateral con-
sent. Even if the penumbra! right of privacy adds nothing of sub-
stance to the right of religious free exercise, it is certainly possible 
that it may help to define the interests implicit in the free exercise 
clause. 
Outside the penumbra cast by the constitutional right of privacy 
and assuming that the state has power to legislate in the area of 
private sexual morality, the propriety of its exercise of this power 
invokes competing values. A representative distillation of Anglo-
American jurisprudence holds that government should intervene in 
these delicate matters, especially with the criminal law, only when 
the conduct in question is openly offensive to others and only where 
state action would be effectual. The appropriate function for the 
state is not to prohibit conduct that is considered immoral but 
rather to limit its effect by preventing it from spilling over into 
society at large.81 In practice, morals legislation appears to be of 
decreasing repute. The Model Penal Code makes lewd behavior a 
crime only when it actually offends others or threatens to become a 
public nuisance; it even excuses "deviate sexual relations" between 
consenting adults.82 These considerations support the contention 
79. 381 U.S. at 495 Gustice Goldberg, concurring). 
SO. This distinction admittedly does not resolve all problems in the area; for ex-
ample, would it be any less an invasion of "fundamental liberty" to sterilize un-
married, as opposed to married, persons? Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) 
with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). And, if there is a substantive right to 
preserve one's capacity to sire natural children, what about the analogous limits upon 
freedom of choice imposed by various racial and religious classifications found in 
current adoption laws? 
Bl. Rostow, Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMB. L.J. 174, 179-80 (summarizing and 
agreeing with the views of Lord Devlin). Considering alcoholism to be the subject of 
criminal sanctions at least partly because society finds it to be morally and aesthetically 
offensive, the various opinions set forth in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), strongly 
imply that the state could not establish criminal sanctions to being drunk in the 
privacy of one's home. 
82. Section 21!!.2, Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Section 251.l of the 
Code defines lewdness as "[a]ny lewd act which [the actor) ••. knows is likely to be 
observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed." See United States v. Klaw, 250 
F.2d 155, 164 (2d Cir. 1965). Cf. Model Penal Code § 2.11(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 
1962), which holds consent to be a general defense to crime where it controverts an 
element of the offense or precludes the harm or evil sought to be prevented. 
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that acts of worship in which only the sect members parttc1pate 
should be afforded a high degree of immunity from government 
regulation. 
c. Voluntary associations. Freedom of association, whether in 
connection with "political, economic, religious or cultural matters," 
is an "inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."83 This formulation im-
plicitly recognizes that the right of association is not just an instru-
ment to be used for goals of a political nature. Unfortunately, all of 
the leading Supreme Court cases on the subject have dealt with 
state regulation of associational relationships detrimental to the 
public good;84 none of the cases has dealt with intraorganizational 
activity as such. Perhaps Dejonge v. Oregon85 could be cited for the 
proposition that, when there is no incitement to action against 
society at large, the state has insubstantial reasons for interfering 
with an association's internal affairs; but there the intragroup ac-
tivity involved only speech that was clearly protected in any event. 
The interest of government with respect to immoral activity 
within a group would seem to be tenuous; the state should not inter-
fere unless the practice in question arouses such deeply felt feelings 
of disgust in the public at large that it may be injurious to the 
society. Even then, if the state must act against immoral intra-
group activity, it should quarantine rather than prohibit it.8° Con-
sistent with this theory, the Model Penal Code provides an affirma-
tive defense to a defendant in an obscenity prosecution where the 
obscene material is held for noncommercial dissemination to per-
sonal friends.87 Also, in Roberts v. Clement88 a state law banning 
nudist colonies was struck down by a three-judge federal district 
83. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
84. See New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); American Communications Association, C.I.O. 
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). But cf. Kedrolf 
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 
U.S. 94 (1952). 
85. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
86. Paraphrasing E. Rostow's paraphrase of the view of Lord Devlin, supra note 
81, at 181. In addition, the legislature should consider whether moral values may 
change in the foreseeable future in respect to the practice in question, and also 
whether the o-iminal law is an appropriate and effective means for bringing about 
the desired end. Id. at 180-81. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). 
87. Section 251.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Similar privileges are provided 
for educators, scientists, and government officials. It would also appear that the 
pandering analysis for obscenity cases promulgated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 
U.S. 463 (1966), lends support to this thesis insofar as commercial exploitation ipso 
facto precludes a concern with intragroup use. 
88. 252 F. Supp. 835, 841-43 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). Accord, Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents of State University of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957). 
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court. Two judges thought that the law was unconstitutionally vague, 
but they also pointed to the common-law rule that indecent ex-
posure or lewdness must be public in order to constitute a criminal 
offense. The third judge stated that the law was an unconstitutional 
abridgement of the right of association and the related right of 
privacy; since the nudist colony was isolated from public contact, 
the state had no interest in prohibiting it.89 Similarly, religious 
intragroup activity should not be prohibited as long as its conse-
quences can be effectively confined within the group.90 
2. Modes of State Action 
Subject to the above limitations, the state may have an interest 
in accommodating religion by creating exemptions from secular 
laws, compelling action or submission when necessary to protect 
public health or welfare, prohibiting certain conduct defined as 
inherently evil, and enacting broad social legislation that indirectly 
impinges on religious interests. 
a. Accommodation. Any effort by government to promote re-
ligion directly would collide head-on with the "wall" separating 
church and state embodied in the establishment clause of the first 
amendment.91 Nevertheless, there is a narrow area in which the free 
exercise clause allows the state to accommodate religion in spite of 
this strong prohibition against establishment: if the legislature 
creates a substantial burden upon a class of citizens, it may carve 
out religious exemptions where the burden relates directly to an 
important aspect of religion.92 Once such an exemption has been 
89. 252 F. Supp. at 848-50. 
90. Some religious activities, such as evangelizing, can appropriately be classified as 
speech. According to the free speech decisions of the Supreme Court, the first amend-
ment posits an open society with respect to ideas and their advocacy. Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) ijustice Holmes, dissenting); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) ijustice Brandeis, concurring). There is no 
reason why the expression of emotions and feelings, particularly when occurring in 
circumscribed groups, should not enjoy the same protected status as political speech. 
See Emerson, supra note 70, at 879-81, 938. 
91. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) with Illinois ex rel. 
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
92. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum), aff d, 
380 U.S. 163 (1965); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1963) (dictum) 
(government subsidy of armed-forces chaplains); State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 
206 P.2d 1022 (1949) (Sabbatarian exemption for Sunday closing law). Judicial excep-
tions resulting from the free exercise clause itself have also been made. See Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (exception to availability-for-work requirement for state 
unemployment compensation scheme); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (exception to state narcotics law for peyote worship). Cf. 
Pierce v. Lavallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) (implied recognition of duty of state 
prison to accommodate religious worship). Giannella, in The Religious Liberty 
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1389 (1967), argues that the tension between the 
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created, however, it must be broadly construed so as to include all 
religions. 93 
Professor Kurland94 contends that government cannot legisla-
tively or judicially confer religious exemptions to general laws which 
are within the power of the state to enact. The underlying postulate 
of his devaluation of the free exercise clause is the notion that any 
form of religious exemption would be a "special privilege" which 
would violate fundamental canons of equality and neutrality sup-
posedly inherent in the establishment clause.95 In my opinion, the 
Kurland thesis misconceives the reality of the interrelations between 
religion and the state. Why should religion in some situations merit 
exemption from state-imposed burdens? The answer, I think, is im-
plicit in all of our previous discussion of religious interests and state 
power. Religion postulates loyalties to the divinity and to the sect 
which are, respectively, superordinate to, and competitive with, that 
owing to the state;96 at the same time, religion has the capacity-as 
shown by the Mormons' abandonment of polygamy in the late nine-
teenth century-to adapt its ethical practices in response to notions 
about the proper sphere of secular government. But where the state 
interferes with the faith, therapy, and worship functions of religion, 
these built-in priorities cannot be so easily compromised. Yet it is in 
precisely these areas that government can offer to accommodate reli-
gion without having to sacrifice its own secular policies-where the 
establishment and free exercise clauses must be resolved in favor of the latter as a 
matter of principle. See generally P. Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty 
and Church-State Relations, 67 M1cH. L. REv. 269 (1968). 
93. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, !145 
U.S. 67 (1953); Parker v. C.I.R., 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966). For a discussion of the 
diverse theories, see Seeger v. United States, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd on other 
grounds, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (impermissible classification); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 
233 (2d Cir. 1961) (violation of free exercise clause); Fellowship of Humanity v. 
County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (establishment of 
preferred sects). 
94. Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 4-5, 96 
(1961). 
95. See id. at 26, 96. 
If indeed the establishment clause is but the means of attaining the end specified 
by the free exercise clause, that would seem to cut in favor of a flexible reading of 
the former in deference to the latter. Actually, the two clauses cannot be so easily 
reconciled, especially in light of the altered character of federalism and the greater 
involvement of secular legislation in achieving positive social aims. Hence, it would 
seem more accurate to recognize the inherent tension between the two clauses, since 
that would force one to face frankly the question of which is to prevail in particular 
situations. See Giannella, supra note 92, at 1386-90. It is just this inherent conflict 
between the two clauses which, unhappily, precludes there being a unitary general 
theory of religion in the Constitution. 
96. United States v. Madntosh, 382 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Chief Justice Hughes, 
dissenting); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 808 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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religious practices in question are either intrinsically harmless to 
society or are confined within the sect. Moreover, the public gen-
erally does not feel that religious exemptions confer "special privi-
leges"; a basic operative fact about religion-one that is widely 
understood-is that it imposes severe duties of its own which may 
more than compensate for any additional freedom granted by an 
exemption. Finally, religion properly conceived is not something 
that can be invoked at will, as can free speech; rather, it is a con-
dition defined in terms of status as opposed to situation. Therefore, 
the free exercise clause need not be relegated to a subordinate role. 
b. Compulsion of action or submission. In the public health 
field, the state has an interest in compelling universal action or 
submission (such as a required vaccination) when it is essential to 
preserve the life or health of its citizens. Nevertheless, since govern-
ment compulsion of action or submission touches a sensitive nerve 
in the American conscience, 97 the state should be required to satisfy 
a particularly high burden of justification where the compulsion is 
contrary to religious tenets-especially when the religious system 
defines the compelled action as inherently sinful. Here the state's 
burden can be met only by showing a clear and present danger of 
some substantial harm to society which is within the state's power 
to control. Of course, adoption of such a test raises additional ques-
tions: ·what kind of deference is owed to the legislature's determina-
tion that danger exists? What are the relevant forms of danger 
against which the state may act through compulsion? How im-
mediate must the danger be before the state can intervene by this 
method?08 
c. Direct and secondary prohibitions. The state has a legitimate 
interest in prohibiting unwanted conduct and in regulating certain 
other activity in order to encourage socially desirable results. Crimi-
nal law embodies society's notions of what would undermine its 
minimal moral cohesiveness and physical security. Conduct which 
is viewed as inherently evil (murder, rape, armed robbery, and kid-
97. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1941) CTustice Frankfurter, dissenting). 
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Turner v. Turner, 192 S.2d 787 (Fla. 
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 201 S.2d 233 (Fla. 1967); cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 250 (1963) CTustice Brennan, concurring). 
98. These last two questions tend to merge into one; the threat of contagious 
disease is a form of danger against which the state may act through compulsion, even 
where there is no recent relevant experience with the particular disease. Wright v. 
DeWitt School Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965). But, the danger must be to 
society at large. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). And the 
danger cannot be merely speculative. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 589, 
enforcing 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (per curiam). 
708 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:679 
napping, for example) is directly prohibited. Where the evil is not 
so grossly offensive and dangerous (and assuming it can be isolated 
and effectively quarantined), the rationale underlying such prohibi-
tions seems less compelling. 
Direct prohibitions should not be confused with secondary pro-
hibitions when criminal sanctions are attached for failure to con-
form to certain minimal standards of conduct. Cases involving the 
first amendment often involve such regulatory "crimes"; while the 
state-regulated activity is not inherently evil, it may cause general 
and perhaps severe inconvenience to the community because of the 
manner of its occurrence. For example, the ordinance challenged in 
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington)99 sought to prevent littering 
of the streets-a desirable social objective. Unfortunately, the state 
chose as its method of regulation a ban on the distribution of litera-
ture; since this amounted to prohibition of an activity protected by 
the Constitution, the ordinance was invalidated. The accepted rule 
of decision in controversies involving secondary prohibitions of this 
type is that the law must be narrowly drawn in respect to the specific 
evil.100 It has been suggested that a weighing test be used in those 
instances where it is difficult to separate speech itself from its harm-
ful incidents.101 But the only thing that is properly "weighed" in 
such cases is the appropriateness of the form of the activity in rela-
tion to its own inherent purposes.102 The essence of speech and 
assembly is that it takes place in public; yet regulation is proper 
when the speaker deliberately blocks traffic or invades the privacy 
of the home.103 The same is true with religious action: while evan-
gelism would be meaningless if it could not be pursued in public 
places, there is no compelling reason why a worship service must 
99. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
100. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Thus, in the situation presented 
in Schneider, the state could have attached sanctions directly to the littering itself, 
rather than to the distribution of handbills. 308 U.S. at 162. 
101. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
102. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939). 
103. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); 
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (dictum). 
Another way to make this point is to refer to the distinction between speech in 
its "natural" form and the mechanism of its dissemination. The more traditional the 
latter, the more it supposedly merges into speech itself. Perhaps this was what Justice 
Douglas meant in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943), when he stated 
that "[t]he hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary 
evangelism-as old as the history of the printing presses." More "modern" mech-
anisms, which by their very nature may be more disturbing, are probably also more 
relevant to contemporary society. Such mechanisms may sometimes involve a captive 
audience. Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 83, 86-87. See Trinity Methodist Church v. 
Federal Radio Commr., 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (denial of license of defaming 
broadcaster). 
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take place anyvvhere that the religious group desires.104' In short, if 
the public manifestation of religious conviction is logically and tradi-
tionally related to protected activity, mere public inconvenience is 
not a sufficient justification for prohibiting it altogether. 
d. Welfare legislation with indirect e[f ects. Perhaps the most 
complex mode of state action is economic or social legislation whose 
effect on religious freedom is only indirect. Two factors explain 
this complexity. First, the burden upon religion varies so widely 
from case to case that no rule of thumb, like those in cases prohibiting 
a particular practice, could be attempted which would be remotely ac-
curate. Second, the burden does not always focus specifically upon 
any particular religious practice accurately classifiable as belief, 
worship, or ethical action, but may cut across all the functional 
components. Often this kind of legislation forces the religious prac-
titioner to choose between his religion and some natural or state-
created benefit that he could otherwise enjoy.105 The state's concern 
here is not with any specific evil associated with a particular re-
ligious practice but instead with a "positive" good for society in 
general. Direct and secondary prohibition represents society's under-
lying consensus of the limits of socially permissible behavior, while 
social legislation having indirect effects reflects society's particular-
istic inclination to define the quality of life and to insure that all 
its members participate therein. 
The proper role of the legislature in these cases is to formulate 
social policy and to balance the goods and evils which may result 
from its implementation. The exercise of legislative power in this 
realm should be accorded prima fade validity under whatever con-
stitutional authority it is exercisable; it is not the proper function 
of courts to engage in a balancing process similar to, if not more 
limited than, that which the legislature has already undertaken. The 
appropriate judicial test is two-pronged. First, when the "hard 
choice" for the religious practitioner is the necessary consequence 
of the policy objective advanced by the statute itself, then the legis-
lative scheme should be given a very heavy presumption of validity.106 
104. Compare Matthews v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Cal. App. 2d 800, 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 914 (1962), with Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 
N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956). These and other zoning cases are collected in 
Fernandez, Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 586 n.242 (1963). Cf. 
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
105. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961). 
106. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961), provides, I submit, the perfect 
illustration of this proposition; one key passage answers petitioner's contention that 
the state is constitutionally required to provide a Sabbatarian e.xemption to its 
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Thus, the burden should be on the religious claimant to show that 
the preponderant purpose or effect of the legislation is to discrimi-
nate for or against some readily cognizable sect; in practice, this 
could be shown only where the statute explicitly or implicitly uses 
a religious test.107 Second, where the claim is made that a scheme 
can be administered in two or more ways, the burden should be on 
the state to show that the substantive policy is incapable of imple-
mentation by any method of administration which does not impinge 
upon the religious practice.108 Using this two-pronged approach, 
courts would be understandably reluctant to carve out religious 
exceptions to welfare legislation; since these laws are not drafted 
in terms of specific religious practices, to create an exception would 
be directly or indirectly to rewrite their substantive provisions.100 
3. Physical Harm: Of What and to Whom 
Can physical harm within a religious group be tolerated? This 
question evokes basic attitudes toward the role of the state with 
respect to self-degradation, both physical and psychological. On the 
level of state power, it is said that the first amendment is never an 
excuse for harmful overt action.110 True as this may be in the 
political arena where the dissemination of ideas is the instrument 
Sunday-closing law: "Thus, reason and experience teach that to permit the exemption 
might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best possible, elimi-
nates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. Although not dispositive of 
the issue, enforcement problems would be more difficult [with a Sabbatarian exemp• 
tion] •••. " In other words, the legislative policy was not simply to provide a day of 
rest; rather, the objective of having a day of peace and tranquility required that 
there be one common day of rest. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-52 (1961). 
Another example is presented by State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 
(1966), where an Amish parent was convicted for refusing to send his son to a school 
that qualified under the state education law. Although superficially only the parent's 
"ethical practice" of sending his child to a nonqualifying Amish school was infringed, 
what was actually at stake, according to the Amish, was the preservation of their whole 
way of life. Nevertheless, it is within the power of a state to require a minimum level 
of education for all. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (dictum). Clearly 
the predominant intent or effect of the educational requirement was not to outlaw 
any Amish practice. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Although coercion was 
involved, that difficulty is resolved under the parens patriae doctrine. State v. Perri• 
cone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). 
107. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
108. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The reason why the exigencies of 
administration of the government's program command such a low priority is, in brief, 
that administration is an "executive" and not a "legislative" function; it is merely 
the "adaptive" subsystem of the political structure in that its main concerns are 
relevancy, efficiency, and flexibility in respect to some substantive policy, and none of 
these qualities are necessarily related to the policy itself. 
109. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 651 (1943) Gustice Frankfurter, 
dissenting). 
110. Emerson, supra note 70, at 917. 
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for achieving desired ends, it is not self-evident in situations where 
the action itself may be a necessary religious expression of cult goals 
and values-the harm being confined within the group. It appears 
that the question of intragroup physical harm has never been 
squarely confronted in the free exercise area, but the weight of 
judicial authority, at least by analogy, supports the conclusion that 
the state can act in such situations.111 The view is that physical 
activity does not cease to be the state's business merely because in-
dividuals happen to carry it out within the confines of a well-
defined group. Such a view, however, assumes that people form 
groups for the purpose of carrying on harmful activity, while the 
reality for many religions is just the reverse: it is the religion itself 
which determines its own values and goals and specifies what action 
is appropriate to achieve them. To illustrate, suppose that some 
imaginary nonaddictive but potentially dangerous drug is used as 
the sacramental medium in a religious rite. Unlike a refusal to 
accept a life-saving blood transfusion, the consumption of the drug 
is not a passive act which could be described as simply letting nature 
take its course. And, although the drug taker wills the act, he does 
not necessarily will the resulting disability (assuming that it is medi-
cally uncertain whether it will occur).112 It is the individual who acts, 
but it is the group acting collectively to apply social pressure which 
probably constitutes the dominant motivation to take the drug. 
'Which way does this group pressure cut? It may be that the state 
should tolerate some room for individual freedom of choice, in 
which case the boundaries of the religious sect provide a ready-made 
mechanism for isolating and quarantining an undesirable practice 
within the group. If, however, the drug is particularly dangerous, 
the state may have a strong interest in entirely prohibiting group 
influence which encourages a destructive practice. State legislatures 
probably have the power to declare anything harmful, even if there 
is little or no scientific evidence to support such a conclusion.113 
When, however, legislation impinges upon a constitutional area of 
privacy, mere assertions by the state unfounded in fact need not be 
111. In Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942), the handling 
of poisonous snakes was held to be within the state's police power, and hence there 
was no real constitutional issue. And in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 
SU!, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), although peyote taking was upheld, it was found not to 
cause any physical or moral harm. Finally, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
163, 165-66 (1878), it was thought that polygamy was harmful not just to the Mormons 
but also to the general social and political order. 
112. In short, assume that consumption of the drug is analogous to smoking 
cigarettes while knowing that some serious lung disease may result. 
113. People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965). 
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taken at face value.114 In the public health field, the state need only 
show that a disease exists in North America and that it is commu-
nicable in order to justify compelled action or submission.115 But 
in the case of sacramental drugs, where the danger of the harm's 
spreading is a sociocultural rather than a physical phenomenon, the 
state should have the burden of proving that the likelihood of 
physiological injury is substantial.116 And if the issue is in doubt, 
expert scientific and medical testimony can be taken at the trial. 
III. .APPLICATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, the sociological analysis outlined in this 
Article is capable both of resolving prior decisions in the free exer-
cise area and of clarifying elements that ought to be considered in 
future cases. Because of the variety of factors involved, I shall not 
attempt to catalogue all of the abstract rules in all of their possible 
applications; instead, I will apply selected principles to familiar 
fact situations in an attempt to illustrate the analytical technique to 
be employed in all free exercise cases. Of course, the guiding prin-
ciple is one of defining interests on both sides of the controversy. 
A. Definition of Religion 
The threshold question is what constitutes religion for purposes 
of invoking the free-exercise clause. The first significant judicial 
attempt to define religion in modern times was made by Chief 
Justice Hughes: religion is "belief in a relation to God involving 
duties superior to those arising from any human relation."117 The 
Second Circuit made the next definitional attempt in construing 
the phrase "religious training and belief" in the selective service law: 
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as 
a means of relating the individual to his fellowman and to his 
universe-a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the 
most highly civilized societies. It is a belief finding expression in a 
conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard 
elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to 
transgressing its tenets.118 
Another federal court of appeals, however, defined the same phrase 
114. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
115. E.g., Wright v. DeWitt, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965). 
116. This assumes, of course, a bona fide constitutional claim. People v. Woody, 61 
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). There, however, the court did not 
indicate how much the state must adduce in the way of proof. 
117. United States v. Madntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1930) (dissenting opinion). 
118. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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in terms of a relationship with a "Supreme Being,"118 and this re-
quirement was adopted by Congress in subsequent formulations of 
the selective service law.120 Nevertheless, after the Supreme Court 
had said, in a different context, that it was a violation of the estab-
lishment clause for the state to favor religions based upon belief in 
God over religions founded upon different beliefs,121 it followed 
that this construction of the selective service law was unacceptable. 
A new judicial definition was offered, phrased in terms of the func-
tional importance of the belief to the individual in question: "[T]he 
test . . . is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful 
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by 
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the 
exemption."122 Thus, many varieties of moral and philosophical 
tenets may now qualify one for exemption, despite the Court's dis-
claimer with respect to these as well as political, sociological, and 
economic beliefs.123 Paradoxically, while the Court rejected a classi-
fication based upon the contents of belief, it referred to the latest 
trends in theology and provided such disparate statements of the 
core of religion as, "[m]eaning within meaninglessness, the power 
of Being," and "[d]evotion of man to the highest ideal he can 
achieve ... [the] power that inspires moral purpose."124 
Welcome as this liberalization may be with respect to a legisla-
tive exemption from compulsory military service, it must not be 
adopted for free exercise cases generally. Theoretically, the defini-
tion focuses too exclusively upon the individual and the content 
of his belief and results in a form of cultural relativism in which 
every belief is its own standard.125 Moreover, the definition tends to 
119. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 
(1946). 
120. 50 U.S.C, app. § 456(j) (1964). This definition was eliminated in the 1967 
amendments to the selective service statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456G) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
121. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
122. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). 
123. See the facts of the three cases reviewed in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163, 165-69 (1965). 
124. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180, 183 (1965). 
125. But see Giannella, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV, L. REv. 1381, 
1423-31 (1967). Professor Giannella, although denying equal standing to practices ad-
vancing an individual's psychological or spiritual development, would open the door to 
those nontheistic manifestations of conscience that are intensely felt, selfless, and based 
upon humanitarian values. Not only does this position frankly depend on the author's 
evaluation of good morals and theology, but it also necessitates an inquiry into the 
claimant's subjective sincerity, and into the question of whether or not his specific 
nontheistic objection is founded upon "religious" belief. But since (apart from situa-
tions where the claimant is a member of a religion in the sociological sense) there 
is no frame of reference for saying whether or not a belief is founded upon a 
claimant's religion (except by means of a test of intensity or ultimate concern), the 
individual could, under such a theory, pretty well write his own ticket. 
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promote the factor of sincerity-admittedly useful for purposes of 
determining standing-into substantive doctrine; it is precisely this 
factor which provides the motivation for exaggerated claims and the 
mechanism for fraudulent ones. How is a court to decide whether 
a claimant is sincere in his beliefs, or sincere only in his desire to 
avoid some secular duty?126 Furthermore, to measure the religious 
claim according to degrees of intensity of individual belief is to 
rely on a subjective factor which is both practically difficult for the 
trier of fact and theoretically lacking in the rationality needed to 
produce a stare decisis effect over time. Under this standard, a court 
would presumably have to have separate "rules" for individuals of 
the same religion who hold a particular tenet with varying degrees 
of intensity. Rather than adhere to such a subjective test, I would 
agree that, even where sincerity is present, "not ... any conduct can 
be made a religious rite and by the zeal of its practitioners swept 
into the First Amendment."127 
I am certainly willing to admit that considerations of personality 
(commitment, sincerity) and culture (tenets, theology) can be im-
portant. Moreover, presumptions favoring sincerity, as well as loose 
standards for ascertaining the "object" of belief, are useful and 
proper-although perhaps a requirement that there be a system 
or hierarchy of beliefs should be added.128 But what is ultimately 
required is a sociological component to the definition of religion. 
Thus, at a minimum, a religion should have a social structure that 
extends beyond the individual and his kin.129 Moreover, the religious 
group (and also the particular practice involved) should either have 
a history of, let us say, more than a generation, 130 or it should be 
characterized by a significant, persisting, and organized following 
of a charismatic leader. Such a leader is defined as one who has had 
a direct encounter with the divine and has thereafter preached the 
new power and structure of his faith through both explicit teach-
ings and the force of his personality. Finally, a sect cannot be con-
sidered a religion unless some of its behavioral patterns can be char-
acterized as worship or sacrament. 
126. Sincerity is sometimes inferred from the claimant's willingness to face the 
consequences. In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963). But this may ob-
viously be the result of a utilitarian calculation of the lesser of two evils. 
127. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943). 
128. This would guard against the possibility of someone claiming that his religion 
consists of a single belief that just happens to conflict with the law under which he 
is being prosecuted. See State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966). 
129. Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693, 315 
P.2d 395, 406 (1957). 
130. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943); People v. Mitchell, 244 
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This sociological definition of religion establishes the minimum 
requirements necessary to raise a constitutional issue under the free 
exercise clause. The definition does not undermine anyone's legiti-
mate rights, and it serves to aid courts both in recognizing genuine 
interests and in disposing of fraudulent claims by those who seek to 
excuse unlawful conduct by invoking the free exercise clause. Even 
a so-called "religion" which turns out to consist entirely of moral 
tenets would not be significantly worse off than if it had been 
properly definable as a religion in the first place, since ethical action 
is the weakest of the religious interests in any event. Furthermore, 
adherents of a "religion" that does not qualify as such retain the 
rights of free expression131 and free association.132 Finally, in a very 
few instances, such persons may be able to argue that their practices 
are protected under the residual right of privacy.133 
B. The Proof of the Pudding 
In applying the sociological analysis to various familiar fact 
situations, we shall begin with cases in which the conflict between 
religious and governmental interests is minimal and then discuss 
instances where the conflict is more acute. For example, evangelical 
activity by Jehovah's Witnesses involves religiously motivated ethical 
action directed toward society in general. Entirely apart from free 
exercise claims, execution of the divine command to preach in 
public is a form of activity protected by the free speech and press 
clauses of the first amendment.134 The state may not legitimately 
prohibit protected religious activity, but may regulate its side ef-
fects; the controlling principle is that a regulation, to be valid, must 
be narrowly drawn to cover a specified social evil. If the objective is 
to prevent fraud, the state can require disclosure of information;135 
if the aim is to raise revenue, it can levy a tax on net income or on 
property;136 if the purpose is to defray expenses of providing addi-
Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966); People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 
69, 73, 394 P.2d 813, 817 (1964). 
llH. E.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
132. E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
133. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. 
Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). But cf. People v. Glaser, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1965) 
(rejecting a Griswold-type argument in respect to private use of marijuana). 
134. Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 563-66, 581-
82 (1963); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 
44-52 (1961). 
135. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
136. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943). 
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tional services necessitated by the particular religious activity, it can 
scale its tax schedules accord,ingly.1s7 
United States v. Kissinger138 presented an example of a general 
law that indirectly impinged upon a person's religious beliefs. There 
the federal government attempted to collect civil penalties from 
petitioner for exceeding his wheat quota; petitioner argued unsuc-
cessfully that it was contrary to the Holy Scripture for him to limit 
his production. Unlike situations presented in the Sunday-closing 
law cases, Mr. Kissinger was forced to make a choice regarding only 
an ethical practice, and he made no allegation that submitting to 
the government regulation would constitute a sin for him. In fact, 
it is doubtful that the tenet which he invoked was derived from his 
religion at all; even if it was, his religion probably did not fall within 
the suggested sociological definition. In any event, it is to be recalled 
that deference to the legislature is the proper rule where the ques-
tioned regulation (wheat quotas) embodies the very policy (limiting 
wheat marketing) that is the object of the law.139 
At first glance, Kissinger would seem to be indistinguishable from 
In re Jenison140 in which defendant's refusal to serve on a jury was 
also motivated by a moral tenet. In Jenison, the state employed the 
sanction of civil contempt in order to effectuate a policy of ensur-
ing a universal supply of jurors. The Minnesota Supreme Court up-
held the contempt conviction, but the United States Supreme Court 
reversed. The Jenison case is distinguishable from Kissinger on the 
ground that when the state attempts to compel someone to engage 
in activity-particularly continuing activity-contrary to religious 
precepts, it is subject to greater limitations than when it passes a 
general law forbidding certain activity.141 The argument could also 
be made that the real policy of the state was to achieve a represen-
tative, rather than a universal, selection of jurors; thus, the com-
137. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943). 
138. 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958). 
139. See text accompanying note 106 supra. Incidentially, it was pointed out by 
the court in Kissinger that claimant was hardly prohibited from growing as much 
wheat as he wanted, but only from selling the excess over the quota. 250 F.2d at 
942-43. 
140. 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, reversed per curiam, 375 U.S. 14, enforcing 
267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963). See text accompanying note 38 supra. 
141. However, if the conscientious objection were solely moral or political, it 
would yield to the state requirement. In other words, the fact of compulsion is very 
likely to have severe repercussions in the therapy subsystem. See Supreme Court Note, 
79 HARV. L. REv. 105, 115 {1965). Whether this is the case should be ascertained by 
the trial court. I cannot agree, therefore, with the proposition put forth by Fernandez, 
supra note 134, at 565-66, that the free exercise clause, outside of worship and sacra-
ment, is merely an embodiment of the equal protection notion. 
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pulsory feature was merely one possible mechanism of judicial 
administration. 
The state can demonstrate a more compelling interest in a case 
like People v. W oodruff.142 There a contempt conviction was upheld 
against a woman who refused to testify before a grand jury concern-
ing an alleged violation of the state narcotics law on the ground 
that her Hindu belief prohibited her from doing anything which 
might harm others. Here, as in Jenison, an ethical tenet was set off 
against a penalty narrowly drnwn to effectuate its goal. This time, 
however, the element of compulsion was legitimized by the integral 
part which grand jury evidence played in the state scheme for con-
trolling crime; the appropriateness of the contempt conviction de-
rived from the fact that the state needed this particular individual 
for her intimate acquaintance with the relevant facts. In re Jenison, 
on the other hand, parallels conscientious objection to military 
service:143 in theory, the draft system needs everybody, but in reality 
it does not-as presently constituted-require those few individuals 
with religious objections. 
Sherbert v. Verner144 resembles In re Jenison in that a universal 
law relating to the execution of governmental policy was involved 
in both cases. But since Sherbert presented no problem of physical 
coercion, it might seem that the state interest should have prevailed. 
Of course, it can be argued that Sherbert involved an impingement 
upon worship as opposed to ethical tenets, but that was also true in 
the Sunday-closing law case.145 In any event, the teaching of Sherbert 
is to be found in an analysis of the word "administration." In the 
Jenison case, the goal of the state was to provide a proper jury. In 
Braunfeld v. Brown,146 the legislation to enforce Sunday closing 
aimed at ensuring one uniform day of rest. In the latter two cases, 
it would have been incorrect to characterize the regulations as 
merely administrative because the governmental policies were em-
bodied in the very provisions that were violated by the religious 
claimants.147 Sherbert, on the other hand, involved "administra-
142. 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966). See text accompanying notes 
35-37 supra. 
143. The Minnesota Supreme Court thought so too, but in a different sense, i.e., 
they compared jury duty with the duty to bear arms, and came to the opposite con-
clusion than the one proposed here. 265 Minn. at 99, 120 N.W.2d at 518-19. In-
cidentally, I do think there is a constitutional requirement of a religious-objector 
exemption to the draft. See note 141 supra. 
144. !174 U.S. 398 (1963). See note 106 supra and text accompanying note 27 supra. 
145. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961). 
146. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
147. This is a difficult notion to grasp, partly because such words as "policy," 
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tion" in its stricter meaning: administration of a scheme to confer 
the specified benefits. 
Functionally speaking, administration is the political system's 
analogue to ethical action in the religious system: the criteria for 
this form of "adaptation" are again such neutral norms as "suita-
bility," "efficiency," and "flexibility." For example, in Sherbert the 
South Carolina Employment Security Commission decided that 
petitioner's unavailability for Saturday work on religious grounds 
triggered that provision of the unemployment compensation law 
which disqualified workers who failed to accept suitable jobs when 
offered. It is conceded that the state's policy can be defined in 
terms of a class eligible for the benefits it bestows,148 but for that 
classification to prevail over a first amendment claim it must logically 
relate to the statute's goal in the narrow sense. It would be logical 
for South Carolina to ·withhold benefits from nonproductive mem-
bers of society-those who are unwilling to work at all-since the 
purpose of an unemployment compensation scheme is to provide 
funds in lieu of wages when workers unexpectedly lose their jobs and 
must seek other employment. But on the facts of Sherbert, the state 
did not contend that petitioner failed to come ·within the scope and 
intent of the statute; rather, the claim was that if she were allowed 
to collect while remaining idle, the door would be open to fraudu-
lent claims which would both deplete the state's funds and discourage 
employers from scheduling Saturday work. Yet the policy of provid-
ing unemployment benefits was neither to prevent fraud nor to in-
fluence businessmen to decide what days to remain open. Thus, the 
justification for depriving petitioner of her benefits was purely ad-
ministrative: to conserve and allocate resources in order to achieve 
the policy of the statute. The state had no necessary commitment 
"purpose," "goal,'' "object," and "aim" have a dual meaning. On the one hand, they 
refer to "ultimate ends" definable in terms of health, welfare, and so on (e.g., "to 
further the health and productivity of workers"); on the other hand, they refer to 
immediate goals definable only by a tautological statement incorporating the terms 
of the statute (e.g., "the 'goal' of unemployment compensation is to provide funds 
for workers who are unemployed"). We use these words only in the latter sense. To 
do otherwise would be to open the door to justification of requirements totally un-
related to the statute except by an upwards leap to superordinate ultimate goals. 
To wit, "Since the purpose of Sunday-dosing laws is to help produce more efficient 
workers, a relevant way of administering this policy would be to require all laborers 
to attend trade school for four hours on Sunday morning." I do not imply an answer 
to the problem of whether or not the state has power to enact such provisions in 
general, but only that they would not be upheld under the Braunfeld principle 
against attack under the free exercise clause. 
148. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (nonavailability of Social Security 
benefits). 
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to any particular means of coping with problems incidental to the 
achievement of its policy. This explains why it is reasonable in cases 
involving "administration" to require the state to "demonstrate 
that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses 
·without infringing First Amendment rights.''149 It is not enough 
for the state to show that the questioned regulation is the most 
efficient way of administering the statutory policy; it must prove 
that no other reasonable method is available that would be likely to 
effectuate that policy. 
Turning to the criminal law, prima fade the state interest in 
prohibiting acts generally considered to be evil in themselves out-
weighs the religious interest in ethical action; this may not be the 
case, however, if the practice is worship or sacrament and clearly 
confined within an established and well-defined sect. Accordingly, 
Reynolds v. United States,150 declaring polygamy unlawful, was 
rightly decided. "Polygamy, although a basic tenet of theology of 
Mormonism, is not essential to the practice of the religion.''151 
Rather, the moral tenet only motivated action toward other human 
beings, who-though they may have been conditioned to accept their 
fate-were relegated to such a status of inferiority that the state 
might well have anticipated harmful effects to the social and politi-
cal spheres of the Mormon community.152 Moreover, since the state 
does not approve of polygamy as a status, an argument premised on 
Griswold is thereby undercut; the concern of bigamy laws is not 
with the acts within the family unit but rather with the legitimacy 
of the status itself. 
Handling poisonous snakes is a primitive practice of a religion 
which, taken as a whole, probably cannot be considered to be primi-
tive. 'While the practice appears to be ritualistic, the ethical aspect 
is equally prominent: it is a form of evangelism in which the be-
lievers' power of faith is demonstrated to an audience in order to 
induce them to become true believers. Although some precautions 
are taken to prevent the snakes from escaping into the crowd, these 
protections are often insufficient to preclude potential danger.153 
Therefore, the state is justified in prohibiting the ethical practice 
in order to eliminate the danger. 
Fortunetelling must similarly be classified as an ethical practice 
149. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, 410 (1962). 
150. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
151. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76, 394 P.2d 813, 820 (1964). 
152. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878). 
153. Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). 
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insofar as it relates to the external environment and is practiced 
upon people who are not cult members, even though they may be-
lieve in it. Moreover, to the extent that fortunetellers customarily 
ply their trade individually, they may not act in a religious capacity. 
In any case, the state interest is not to interdict actions causing 
physical injury, but merely to protect people from their own gull-
ibility.154 Thus, it is not necessary to prohibit fortunetelling under 
all circumstances, but only when it is done for a fee.155 The Supreme 
Court has often supported efforts to isolate commercial exploitation 
conducted under the guise of some alleged first amendment right.m 
On the other hand, state statutes have consistently been construed 
not to ban seances, particularly if they take place in "church."167 The 
location of the seance need not itself be decisive, however, since 
wherever conducted the practice can be characterized as worship with 
strong overtones of communion. Although pecuniary exaction may 
be involved here as well, it is not for the purpose of commercial 
gain.158 Even if the state did consider seances to be morally harmful, 
it has a rather weak interest in preventing such intragroup activity. 
Another contemporary problem arises when a court is called 
upon to direct a compulsory blood transfusion to an adult in order 
to save his life. In such situations, a court is neither invoking criminal 
law nor suppressing worship. If a policy approach to balancing is 
used, it is tempting to say that the strong state interest in preserving 
the life of its citizens should prevail. Under a closer analysis, however, 
the answer is not so simple. Jehovah's Witnesses regard themselves as 
under a divine command neither to give nor to receive blood trans-
fusions. This is premised on the belief that "[t]he blood is the soul" 
(Deuteronomy 12:33) and that "[w]e cannot drain from our body 
part of that blood, which represents our life, and still love God with 
our whole soul, because we have taken away part of 'our soul-our 
blood-' and given it to someone else."159 This prohibition is an 
154. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Justice Jackson, dissenting). 
155. E.g., State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939 (1912). 
156. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 
U.S. 52 (1942). This line was also pursued briefly in respect to the Jehovah's Witness 
penchant of asking for money when distributing their religious tracts. Jones v. City 
of Opielka, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
157. Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940); State v. Delaney, 1 N.J. 
Misc. 619, 122 A. 890 (1923). 
158. This can be compared with passing the collection plate, an analogy which 
was incorrectly applied to evangelism in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 
(1943). The consent to pay should be pre-existing, not the result of an on-the-spot 
sales pitch. 
159. From, BLOOD, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw OF Goo, quoted in In re Brooks' Estate, 
32 III. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (excerpted). 
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ethical tenet insofar as it is a universal norm prohibiting action in 
the external environment. That interpretation is supported by the 
seeming historical and sociological origins of the command: it ap-
pears to be directed against cannibalism and animal sacrifice, a 
crucial focus in the differentiation of ethical monotheism away from 
idolatry and primitive notions of magic. At the same time the quoted 
Biblical passages seem to have no bearing at all upon blood transfu-
sion; in fact, the Jehovah's Witnesses' doctrine gives the appearance 
of being a tragic theological mistake. This illustrates an important 
point made earlier about ethical practice: it should not be difficult 
for a religion faced with current pressures from the external environ-
ment to reinterpret its ethical tenets without in any way altering the 
fundamental faith or mode of worship. 
But our analysis of the religious interest does not end here. The 
moral tenet involved in refusing a blood transfusion is unique be-
cause of its necessary implications for the therapy function of reli-
gion. Most moral transgressions involve a sin against God, but the 
sinner may receive forgiveness if he is later truly penitent. No such 
mechanism is available to a Jehovah's Witness who receives a blood 
transfusion-even if his conscience has remained pure-because it is 
the very condition or status of having alien blood ("soul") in his body 
that creates a permanent alienation from God. This conclusion is not 
totally free from doubt; indeed, it may be only the act of exchanging 
blood that is sinful, rather than the resulting status. This was hinted 
at in Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown 
College,100 where petitioner argued that, if responsibility for the 
transfusion would be accepted completely by the judge and the 
hospital, the matter would be so far out of her hands that she would 
not be accountable to God for her act. But that attitude may not 
have been representative of her faith; the judge himself was appre-
hensive that the mounting pressure of the situation in the hospital 
may have caused her convictions to waver.161 In the future, this issue 
should be explicitly decided with the aid of "expert" testimony by 
leading Jehovah's Witnesses learned in that sect's doctrine of sin. 
If the religious interest in refusing a blood transfusion is greater 
than at first appeared, the interest of the state is somewhat less 
compelling. Where there are no public side effects, passive suicide 
160. 331 F.2d 1000, 1007-09, petition for rehearing en bane denied, 331 F.2d 1010 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Jones v. President&: Directors of Georgetown College, 
377 U.S. 978 (1964). 
161. 331 F.2d at 1007. If this is so, her sin might have been even greater to have 
so ignored the prescription of her sect. 
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is of little concern to the state. The court in In re Brooks' Estate162 
agreed with this proposition; not only does a patient's refusal to 
accept a blood transfusion involve no danger to other members of 
the community, but to hold otherwise would entail the conclusion 
that the individual has ultimate value only as a cog in the state 
machine. "In the final analysis, what has happened here involves a 
judicial attempt to decide what course of action is best for a partic-
ular individual, notwithstanding that individual's contrary views 
based upon religious convictions."163 In a different context, Justice 
Brennan stated, "But we must not confuse the issue of governmental 
power to regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious beliefs 
with the quite different problem of governmental authority to 
compel behavior offensive to religious beliefs."164 Accordingly, in 
order to justify a compelled blood transfusion, the state should show 
a clear and present danger of some substantive evil to society; it 
should not be able to meet this burden merely by pointing to a 
law against attempted suicide.165 On the other hand, cases in which 
the believer directly or indirectly attempts to make the life or death 
decision for someone else-an infant or an unborn child-can be 
easily distinguished.166 But should the fact that a dying parent has 
minor children also be sufficient to uphold state action compelling 
a transfusion? Following the principle that the state may compel 
action contrary to religious belief only when substantial harm to 
others is threatened, I would distinguish between the case of very 
young children for whom loss of the mother would be likely to 
result in severe emotional and psychological strain, and the case of 
older children for whom the father, school, and peer groups could 
provide an adequate substitute.167 Expert testimony from psychol-
ogists would be helpful in drawing the line. 
A particularly acute confrontation between strong interests of 
religion and the state would occur where drugs, whose possession or 
use is prohibited by the criminal law, are employed for worship and 
162. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). 
163. 32 Ill. 2d at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442. 
164. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 250 (1963) (concurring opinion). 
165. But see Recent Development, Authorization of Involuntary Blood Transfusion 
for Adult Jehovah's Witness Held Unconstitutional, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 554 (1966). 
166. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 
463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). 
167. In Application of Georgetown Hosp., 331 F.2d 1000 (1964), the mother, 
significantly, did have an infant only seven months old. See also Comment, Unau-
thorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 860 (1966). 
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sacramental purposes. Fortunately for judges, many possible claims 
can be disposed of prior to a test on the merits. First, the defendant 
in a drug prosecution may lack standing to make a free exercise 
claim either because he does not belong to a group qualifying as a 
religion under the comprehensive definition set forth above, or 
because of a lack of sincere commitment to the sect. It would not be 
sufficient for the claimant to assert that the group has some doctrinal 
connection with a traditional religion such as Buddhism; rather, 
the practice of using drugs itself must have historical antecedents or 
be instituted by a charismatic religious leader. Moreover, there 
should be direct personal contact at some point in time between the 
alleged sect member and the historical movement he claims to be 
part of. For example, one should not qualify as a member of the 
Native American Church (Indian peyote worship) just because he 
has read about it and has decided that some of its practices or ideas 
appeal to him; the situation would be different, howevP:, .:,hould he 
enter a monastery or Indian reservation and undergo the total dis-
cipline of the church. Since the rationale for giving a preferred 
position to religion relates largely to its character as a status or 
obligation to which one is more or less permanently committed, it 
follows that if a person is able to turn his commitment on and off 
at will, he will be in a lesser position to claim special treatment. 
Thus, an isolated individual formally unrelated to any church or 
sect cannot achieve an exemption from narcotics laws just because 
he "believes in" taking drugs and can quote authority for his belief.168 
The second condition for weighing the religious interest against 
the state interest in controlling narcotics is that the use of the drug 
should be confined to worship--preferably as a sacramental medium. 
Even if a claimant belongs to a church that uses drugs in this manner, 
he is clearly not protected if he should be apprehended at home in 
possession of narcotics.169 To hold otherwise would be to open up 
the possibility of using nominal religious affiliation to evade the 
narcotics laws. 
Finally, where drug consumption is part of worship, the ceremony 
must be scrutinized closely to determine whether its predominant 
168. People v. Mitchell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966). 
169. See State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966). But, in In re Grady, 
61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), a defendant convicted for pos• 
session of narcotics in his house was granted a new trial on the issue of whether or 
not he actually engaged in good faith in the practice of his religion. However, other 
people were seen going in and out of his house, so that an inference could be drawn 
that a religious meeting took place there. 
724 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:679 
purpose is ritual. If the emphasis is either upon heightened percep-
tion and awareness of the physical environment, or upon feelings of 
· benevolence and good will toward one's friends, then the practice 
cannot qualify as worship. In the leading case in this area, People 
v. Woody,170 these phenomena were present, but they were con-
sidered by members of the Native American Church to be secondary 
to the primary functions of peyote-an object of worship and a 
sacramental medium. The California Supreme Court held that the 
state narcotics law could not constitutionally be applied to penalize 
the use of peyote as a part of the Indians' religious ceremony. 
It might be objected that this reliance upon sacrament and 
worship leaves in doubt the status of the mystic-one who communes 
directly with the Deity. Unfortunately, there is no way for a court 
to determine whether a given individual is capable of communicat-
ing directly with God; to accept assertions of this capacity at face 
value would again invite wide-ranging evasion of the law. If the 
mystic has a significant following, perhaps he could qualify as a 
charismatic religious leader. In any event, the narcotics laws do not 
prohibit mystical experiences as such, but only their inducement 
by artificial means. 
When the drug-taking ceremony does qualify as worship or 
sacrament, application of the narcotics laws would destroy the sub-
stance of the religion; therefore, in order to override the strong 
religious interest, the policy and scientific foundations for applica-
tion of the criminal law should be very compelling. Peyote has 
hallucinatory effects lasting about twelve hours and sometimes causes 
acute anxiety, but its symptoms are not permanent and it is non-
addictive.171 Here, the state interest is probably not strong enough to 
prohibit use of the drug. If the state cannot ban the use of peyote in 
a religious service, a fortiori it cannot prohibit the use of marijuana 
for the same purpose; the effects of marijuana are of short duration, 
and it seldom results in aggressive or antisocial behavior. Moreover, 
the causal connection between taking marijuana and subsequently 
taking physiologically injurious drugs, such as heroin, has not been 
proved.172 LSD, although also nonaddictive, is much more potent in 
its "severe untoward psychological effects," with symptoms resem-
170. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). 
171. Jarvik, Drugs Used in Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in L. Goom,IAN &: 
A. GILJ\IAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 189, 205 (1965). 
172. Jaffe, Drug .dddiction and Drug .dbuse, in L. GOODMAN &: A. GILMAN, supra 
note 171, at 208. 
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bling schizophrenia which cannot be predicted in advance.173 Argu-
ably, an individual should be allowed to play this form of Russian 
roulette, particularly if consumption is part of a religious service. 
However, LSD not only has severe psychological and physiological 
effects long after it has left the blood stream, but it also may seri-
ously impair the person's ability to make rational decisions many 
weeks after he has taken one dose.174 There is also some evidence 
that the "religious experience" effect of LSD does not lead to gen-
uine religion, since it fails to produce "a continuing pattern of disci-
pline."170 For these reasons, LSD can be constitutionally withheld 
from religious use.176 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The main concern of this Article has been the formulation of 
a workable theory for assessing free exercise claims-a theory that 
depends upon the process of defining the interests involved in a 
given case in terms of formal categories of general applicability 
which posit their respective "weights" largely without reference to 
policy preferences. But why, one may ask, is it necessary to put so 
much weight upon sociological theory, particularly when the more 
"enlightened" trend in contemporary religious thought is toward 
reliance upon individual conscience and humanism rather than 
transcendentalism, superst1t10n, and church-prescribed dogma? 
Should not some weight be given to conscientious objections to civil 
and criminal laws based upon personal natural theology intensely 
held, particularly if based upon unselfish and humanitarian uni-
versalistic values? Under such a test, the court would go beyond 
merely inquiring into sincerity as a means of assessing standing but 
rather would seek to determine if failure to sustain the conscientious 
173. Jarvik, supra note 171, at 208. 
174. Farnsworth &: Prout, HARVARD UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES REl'ORT ON DRUGS 
(1967). 
In any event, it does not seem likely that cases involving LSD or other more harm-
ful drugs will arise; not only will the "sect" probably fail to qualify as a "religion" 
under the definition proposed in this Article, but also few genuine religions founded 
upon such patently self-destructive practices will be able to maintain their identity 
as a group for extended periods of time. 
175. Professor Huston Smith of M.I.T., The Boston Globe, April 20, 1967, at 12. 
176. However, where marijuana is involved, the state interest is so weak that even 
a lesser religious interest might prevail. See In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 
39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). In such a case, the state is in effect prohibiting the con-
sumption of "evil" sensations. The analogy with developments in the law in respect to 
obscenity and morals is compelling. 
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objection would result in a fundamental sense of alienation-analo-
gous to sin-from one's very being.177 
There are several theoretical and practical difficulties with such 
a construction of the free exercise clause. First, the fundamental 
sense of guilt or alienation referred to would probably arise only in 
those few cases where the individual was compelled to act or 
acquiesce over a considerable span of time in a way which would 
substantially affect his present and future life. But one in such 
a position can avail himself of a therapeutic remedy simply by being 
true to his conscience. A member of a religious group may, it is 
true, have available the same mechanism of therapy, but the source 
of the mechanism lies in an authority which competes with govern-
ment at the visible level of structure and worldly action. In short, 
there is a certain logic in the thought that the Framers set aside an 
area for that which is, as practiced, on the same level as government 
and which is therefore necessarily competitive with it. To have based 
the exemption instead directly upon the source of religious au-
thority, whether it be God or personal conscience, would have been 
to posit a superior-inferior relationship between the individual and 
government which could be invoked by anybody with sufficiently 
strong convictions. The result would be that governmental authority 
would be potentially threatened at all points and at all times. An 
exemption socially determined, on the other hand, would be limited, 
easy to ascertain, and designed to avoid random conflicts between 
the individual and authority which could ultimately result in politi-
cal conflict. 
Second, the psychological examination of the individual neces-
sitated by the personal-conscience approach would be susceptible to 
attempts at deception. As a matter of practice, such an approach 
would entail reliance upon finders of fact in an area where "fact" is 
an illusory concept; the fact finders would undoubtedly be prej-
udiced by their feelings about the religious tenet invoked or the 
policy embodied in the law sought to be enforced. 
Nevertheless, the criticism of a sociological approach to the free 
exercise clause based upon the notion that it embodies an outdated 
dependence upon organized and superstitious religions has a certain 
rhetorical point. I can only repeat that, given our philosophy that 
government has only those powers delegated to it by the people, it 
177. Giannella, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1426, 
1428-29 (1967). 
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was thought that in establishing the rules of the political process, a 
further disengagement had to be made respecting the one realm in 
man's experience which was competitive with government in its 
structure and in its claims to loyalty and obedience. Religion, like 
government, was usually practiced within social organizations which 
prescribed discipline and duty for their members. Moreover, the 
very multiplicity of sects and denominations in early America tended 
to make religious practices self-contained. Above all, the drafters 
may have thought a clause protecting religious free exercise would 
pose no danger to government because religion did not really have 
much to do with real life but only with speculation about the nature 
of the Universe and of God. To the extent that this assumption has 
proven unfounded in the light of new trends in theology and 
religious practice, it must be confessed that the free exercise clause 
is so much of an historical anomaly. Unfortunately, a resolution in 
favor of accommodating individuals who object to government regu-
lation on the basis of their own consciences cannot properly be 
obtained under the free exercise clause itself; the adoption of that 
doctrine would have such a fundamental impact upon the structure 
of duly constituted governmental authority that a constitutional 
amendment would, I think, be required. 
Nevertheless, some positive, if less radical, benefits have accrued 
from the analysis offered in this Article. For one, most of the past 
decisions are supported by the principles elaborated herein. More-
over, the ability to distinguish among ethical action, worship, or 
sacrament, or among the various modes of governmental action, does 
not require a great deal of expertise in sociology on the part of judges 
and lawyers. Indeed, simply uncovering such a multiplicity of factors 
and assumptions should promote more searching analyses of first 
amendment problems generally. Finally, in respect to the problem of 
religion specifically, I have intended this Article to go beyond mere 
attempts to formulate legal doctrine. When I have spoken of the 
interests of religion as being opposed to the interests of the state, I 
have actually been referring to an intertwined complexity-a process 
of interaction. However one may feel about whether religion or the 
state should triumph in a given case, he should take note of the 
dominant characteristic of the American system: that religion and 
the state, despite any conflict between their ultimate loyalties, have 
been able to adjust to each other. In those few situations where there 
is potential for a serious clash, both religion and government have 
shown the capacity to recognize priorities of interest and to make 
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concessio.ns. Of fourse, the establishment clause also serves an 
important function by helping to keep potential controversies 
involving religion out of the political arena, where heated passions 
and demagoguery could only operate to obscure the nature of the 
interests at stake, All of these factors have combined to provide what 
has been a remarkably satisfactory mechanism for dealing with 
problems posed by the citizen's dual allegiance to religion and 
the state. 
